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Abstract 
When considering the security of a system, the analyst must simultaneously work with two 
types of properties: those that can be shown to be true, and those that must be argued as being 
true. The first consists of properties that can be demonstrated conclusively, such as the type of 
encryption in use or the existence of an authentication scheme. The second consists of things 
that cannot be so demonstrated but must be considered true for a system to be secure, such as 
the trustworthiness of a public key infrastructure or the willingness of people to keep their 
passwords secure. The choices represented by the second case are called trust assumptions, and 
the analyst should supply arguments explaining why the trust assumptions are valid. 
This thesis presents three novel contributions: a framework for security requirements 
elicitation and analysis, based upon the construction of a context for the system; an explicit 
place and role for trust assumptions in security requirements; and structured satisfaction 
arguments to validate that a system can satisfy the security requirements. The system context is 
described using a problem-centered notation, then is validated against the security requirements 
through construction of a satisfaction argument. The satisfaction argument is in two parts: a 
formal argument that the system can meet its security requirements, and structured informal 
arguments supporting the assumptions exposed during argument construction. If one cannot 
construct a convincing argument, designers are asked to provide design information to resolve 
the problems and another pass is made through the framework to verify that the proposed 
solution satisfies the requirements. Alternatively, stakeholders are asked to modify the goals for 
the system so that the problems can be resolved or avoided. The contributions are evaluated by 
using the framework to do a security requirements analysis within an air traffic control 
technology evaluation project. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Over the last few years, reports of software security failures have become commonplace. 
Statistics from the Software Engineering Institute's CERT Coordination Center, a center of 
internet security expertise, show that the number of reported application vulnerabilities rose 
from 171 in 1995 to 5,990 in 2005 (CERT, 2006). The sources of problems are diverse. One 
source is programming errors; in 2003, one internet worm named Blaster, exploiting a flaw in 
Microsoft's Windows operating system, reportedly infected approximately 500,000 computers 
(Gallagher, 2003). "Estimates are that it [Blaster] cost approximately $1.3 billion to correct and 
in lost productivity" (Ibid). Another source is not looking at security requirements of the 
complete system. For example, CardSystems Solutions exposed details of some 40 million 
credit cards by storing unneeded transaction history data where hackers could get to it (Dash, 
2005); this visible storage was part of their system but not part of their security planning. The 
resulting loss has not been disclosed, but is known to be in excess of several millions of dollars 
(Federal Trade Commission, 2006). These two examples strongly suggest that improving 
software-based system security would have a significant financial impact. 
This thesis addresses the second source of security problems: the failure to consider security 
requirements of the complete system, or said another way, the failure to obtain adequate 
security requirements for a system. By adequate security requirements, we mean requirements 
that if respected, lead to a system's security goals being satisfied. Adequate general 
requirements have been shown to have a very positive impact on the success of projects: for 
examples see the Standish Group's Chaos reports (Standish Group, 1995,1999,2001), and the 
introduction to Mead et al. (Mead, Hough, & Stehney, 2005). Although the empirical evidence 
is not yet unequivocal, there is evidence that adequate security requirements will have as 
positive an impact on system security as adequate general requirements have on system success 
13 
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(Mead, Hough et al., 2005). The CLASP process (Comprehensive Lightweight Application 
Security Process), co-authored by John Viega (Viega & McGraw, 2002; Viega, 2005a, b), 
emphasizes the importance of security requirements, saying that one should "[e]nsure that 
security requirements have the same level of 'citizenship' as all other 'must haves. "' (Secure 
Software Inc., 2006) 
Before continuing further, we must agree on what is meant by system. In this thesis, the word 
system includes the software, and in addition the people who use the software and all the bits 
and pieces around the software (computers, printers, etc. ). We are dealing with requirements, 
and this definition of system is consistent with common usage in requirements engineering. For 
example, Zave and Jackson say that "we use 'system' only to refer to a general artifact that 
might have both manual and automatic components, such as an 'airline reservation system'. " 
(1997). Van Larnsweerde uses the word similarly: "The target system is not just a piece of 
software, but also comprises the environment that will surround it; [ ... ]. " (2000). Going a 
bit 
further back, Swartout & Balzer include the pipes & bins in the system when describing their 
package router example (1982). In summary, we can say that requirements engineering is 
charged with providing detailed & relevant information about the requirements that a system is 
to satisfy. Our usage of system is consistent with this. 
We claim that the adequacy of security requirements can be evaluated using three criteria. 
The first criterion is clarity: one must have a clear understanding of what the security 
requirements mean, and their effects within the system context in which they apply. The second 
is incorporation of assumptions about behavior: security requirements must take assumptions 
about the behavior of objects found in the system into consideration. The third is satisfaction: 
one must be able to determine whether the security requirements satisfy the security goals, and 
whether the system can satisfy the requirements. We propose three contributions to assist a 
requirements engineer with developing security requirements that satisfy these criteria. The first 
is a security requirements framework, incorporating system context and providing a practical 
definition of security requirements. The second is an explicit place and role for assumptions, 
concentrating on their role in security requirements satisfaction arguments. The third is the use 
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of formal and informal structured arguments to validate that a system can satisfy its security 
requirements. The second and third contributions are incorporated into the first, our security 
requirements framework, facilitating an understanding of eliciting, validating, and verifying 
security requirements and other artifacts. 
We explore these three criteria in Sections 1.1 - 1.3, following. The contributions are further 
discussed in Section 1.4 of this introduction and, of course, throughout the remainder of this 
thesis. 
1.1 Criterion One - Clarity of Security Requirements 
Security needs arise when stakeholders establish that some objects involved in a system, be 
they tangible (e. g., cash) or intangible (e. g., information), have value. Such objects are termed 
assets (ISO/lEC, 1999c), and the stakeholders naturally wish to protect themselves from any 
harm that might come from abuse of these assets. Security goals express this desire, describing 
the involved assct(s) and the harm to be prevented. The usual approach is to treat these security 
goals as non-functional requirements. The question to answer is whether this approach results in 
clear security requirements that respond to the needs of the system. 
1.1.1 Security Requirements as Non-Functional Requirements 
Security requirements have traditionally been considered to be non-functional quality 
requirements ((Chung, Nixon, Yu, & Mylopoulos, 2000; Devanbu & Stubblebinc, 2000; 
Firesmith, 2004; Glintz, 2005) and many others), meaning that like other kinds of quality 
requirements (e. g., performance, usability, cost to run), they do not have simple yes1no 
satisfaction criteria. Instead, one must somehow determine whether a quality requirement has 
been satisficed (satisfied well enough) (Mylopoulos, Chung, & Nixon, 1992). This is diff icult in 
general, and security requirements present some additional challenges. First, once one descends 
from the very general and obvious statements (e. g., 'the system should be secure'), instead of 
talking about what is to happen, people tend to think about and express security requirements in 
terms of things that are to be prevented. Verifying that something is prevented can be likened to 
15 
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proving a negative; it is very difficult, if not impossible, to show that there are no counter- 
examples. Second, for security requirements, the tolerances on 'satisfied enough' are much 
smaller, usually approaching zero; stakeholders want criteria for security requirements to be 
very close to yes/no. Third, the amount of time and money that stakeholders might be willing to 
dedicate to satisfying a security requirement can depend on the risk and impact of a security 
failure; one cannot justify a large expense to protect something of low direct or indirect value. 
One must be able to connect specific development & operational expense to the requirements 
being satisfied, in order to determine cost/benefit information. 
Expressing security requirements in a positive sense, similar to functional requirements, 
would reduce the difficulties described above. Functional requirements describe what is to 
happen, not what is not to happen, helping the implementers understand what they are to do. 
Tolerances are (in theory) simpler; ftinctional requirements have binary satisfaction criteria, 
either the function happens or it does not, and they can have test criteria to determine what 'the 
function happens' means. The cost of making something happen is easier to measure than the 
cost of making something not happen, facilitating cost/benefit analysis. Expressing security 
requirements in the positive sense (what is to happen) would bring similar benefits. 
1.1.2 Security Requirements& Context 
System context can have a profound effect on both security goals and security requirements. 
As said earlier, in this thesis the word system represents more than the software. We include the 
environment the software runs within: the people who will use, maintain, and depend on the 
system; the physical environment the system is to exist within; the operating environment the 
software runs within; and any systems, computer-based and otherwise, already in place. 
Security requirements can vary, depending on the context. To illustrate, consider some software 
intended for use by an executive on his or her desktop computer. The software may or may not 
have any intrinsic need for security; a spreadsheet program would be a good example. Even 
though the spreadsheet program may have no intrinsic security goals associated with it, the 
information the executive manipulates may be confidential, creating a maintain confidentiality 
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security goal for the system, where the system comprises the computer, the office, the 
spreadsheet program, the executive, and the confidential data. The security goal arises because 
of how the spreadsheet is used, which is a property of the context within which the program 
resides. When the system components {computer, office, spreadsheet program, executive) arc 
considered alone, no confidentiality security goal arises. The goal arises only when 
(confidential data) is added. 
Continuing the example, one might consider satisfying the confidentiality goal by adding a 
security requirement that the system architecture include a locking office door, something 
completely divorced from the software. Alternatively, one might require that the spreadsheet 
program should satisfy the goal, perhaps by addition of authentication and encryption. However, 
these solutions would be inadequate if the executive is in an office that is not soundproofed, and 
either a) the executive uses a program that reads the information aloud, permitting an attacker to 
listen without being seen, or b) if the attacker can hear and decode the keystrokes typed on the 
executive's keyboard (Zhuang, Zhou, & Tygar, 2005). The example shows that properties of the 
system context that are frequently not considered can have a profound effect on the security of 
the system. 
1.2 Criterion Two - Incorporation of Assumptions about Behavior 
When considering system behavior, the requirements engineer must determine which parts of 
the world are part of the problem, and therefore to be included in the analysis. An extreme view 
is that every atom in the universe is part of every problem, and therefore an analysis must 
consider everything made of atoms. As this is clearly impractical, the analyst must choose a 
subset of domains (real-world elements) that s/he considers pertinent (Jackson, 1995,2001). In 
so choosing, the analyst defines the system context; it consists of those domains having 
properties considered relevant to the problem. 
When considering security, one factor influencing an analyst's choice about whether or not a 
domain is relevant is the analyst's set of trust assumptions (Viega, Kohno, & Potter, 2001; 
Viega & McGraw, 2002). Trust assumptions are explicit or implicit choices to trust a domain 
17 
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will behave as expected. These assumptions can have a significant impact on the security of a 
system. For example, most analysts implicitly assume that the compiler is not a security risk, 
and it would never occur to them to include the compiler in the security analysis. In his 1983 
Turing award acceptance lecture, Ken Thompson (1984) demonstrated that this assumption 
might not be justified by showing how a compiler could be a Trojan horse, introducing 
trapdoors into applications. Viega et al. (2001) claim that "application providers often assume 
that their code will execute in a non-hostile environment", and then show how this assumption 
leads to security breaches. Their example shows 'secrets' hidden in code, where the secrets 
easily can be exposed through examination of the executable file. The Thompson and Viega 
examples illustrate how the requirements engineer's implicit trust of some domains in the 
environment can introduce unknown amounts of risk into the system. Viega et al. went as far as 
to say that "without recognizing all the entities and their trust relationships in a software system 
during the requirements phase of a project, that project is doomed from the start. " (2001) 
The voice-reading spreadsheet program example in section 1.1.2 further illustrates the point. 
The analyst easily could tacitly, and erroneously, consider that the spreadsheet program did not 
present a security risk, assuming that the office did not leak information, by not considering its 
use in an office without soundproofed walls. Like context, trust assumptions can have a 
significant impact on security requirements. 
1.3 Criterion Three - Satisfaction of Security Requirements 
If one goes to the trouble to produce security requirements for a system, it is reasonable to 
ask whether the system can satisfy the requirements. The more rigorous the process used to 
establish satisfaction, the more confidence one can have that the system will be secure. The 
strongest process is a proof. A weaker alternative to a proof is an argument. A high-quality 
argument engenders confidence that the requirements will be satisfied. The weaker the 
argument, the more faith one must have that the result will, in the end, be acceptable. 
No analysis of security requirement satisfaction can include every possible domain that could 
be a part of the system. Every proof or argument will include trust assumptions, at minimum 
18 
1.4. Contributions 
that the domains not considered will do no harm, and establishment of satisfaction depends 
upon the validity of these trust assumptions. Rigorous proofs of validity of trust assumptions are 
hard to come by, because malice and accident must be taken into account. Instead of proving 
that a trust assumption is valid, one instead produces arguments that the trust assumption should 
he considered valid. The argument must be sufficiently convincing, using properties of the 
system and domains as evidence. 
Trust assumption validity arguments are, in effect, sub-arguments of the proof or argument 
that security requirements are satisfied, and their quality directly affects the validity of the 
containing argument. The sub-arguments should be an explicit part of establishing satisfaction 
of security requirements. 
1.4 Contributions 
As indicated above, this thesis presents three novel contributions aimed at assisting a 
requirements engineer with developing adequate security requirements: 
I. A security requirements framework, incorporating system context, and providing a practical 
dcfinition of security requirements that have clear yes/no satisfaction criteria. The 
framework also provides a scaffold for the next two contributions. 
2. Further elaboration of trust assumptions, concentrating on their role in security requirements 
satisfaction arguments. 
3. The use of formal and informal structured arguments to validate that a system can satisfy its 
security requirements. 
1.5 Novelty of the Contributions 
The three contributions build upon existing work. The discussion of the meaning of system 
on page 14 showed that context is important in requirements engineering. Others assert that 
security requirements analysis must be placed in a system context, or the analysis will not be 
complete; see, for example, (Devanbu & Stubblebine, 2000) and (Firesmith, 2003a). Our 
contribution is a systematic incorporation of context into a framework for security requirements 
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engineering, and then using the context to discover trust assumptions and to develop the 
satisfaction arguments. 
Trust assumptions are mentioned by name in Viega in (Viega, Kohno et al., 2001; Viega & 
McGraw, 2002), and are alluded to as simple assumptions in other work (e. g., (Firesmith, 
2003a; van Larnsweerde, 2004)). Our contribution is making explicit their role both in 
determining the size of the context and in security requirement satisfaction arguments. 
Satisfaction arguments have appeared in the literature in several guises. For example, 
correctness arguments appear in (Jackson, 2001) and (Hall, Rapanotti, & Jackson, 2005), 
satisfaction arguments in (Attwood, Kelly, & McDermid, 2004), (Hammond, Rawlings, & Hall, 
2001), and (Hull, Jackson, & Dick, 2002: pgs 143-158), adequacy arguments in (Jackson, 
2006), and safety arguments in (Kelly, 1999). Our contribution is the extension of these 
arguments for security, proposing two additional factors that should be considered: trust 
assumptions within a system context. We further propose that representing security satisfaction 
arguments by a combination of formal and structured informal arguments leads to significant 
benefits. The formal arguments provide the ycs/no criteria, assuring that the requirements are 
satisfied, assuming that the trust assumptions are valid. The informal arguments, using a 
jurisprudencc-like style of argumentation, show why the trust assumptions are acceptable. The 
informal arguments are not proofs, but instead are sufficiently convincing in their context. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
Our research was piloted by the three classic steps: a) identify gaps through examination of 
the literature, b) propose ways to fill (some of) the gaps, then c) validate that the gaps are indeed 
filled. The first two steps presented no particular difficulty beyond the inherent intellectual 
challenge. The third step was more problematic. 
Three options to validate the contributions presented in this thesis were considered: 
" Testing the contributions by replaying an existing case study. 
" Testing the contributions using constructed examples. 
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* Testing the contributions in a live industrial project. 
We discuss each of these options in turn below. 
1.6.1 Option I -Validation by Replaying an Existing Case Study 
This form of validation would use as its baseline an existing published case study. The 
project would be run again using the contributions presented in this thesis, and the results 
compared. A case study to be used in this fashion must meet the following preconditions: 
I. The project must have identified security as a success factor. 
2. The documentation in the case study for the requirements phase must be at a level sufficient 
to understand the goals of the project. 
3. There must be sufficient information in the case study to permit construction of the system 
context, to permit use of the contributions of this thesis, and to compare the results. 
Despite extensive searches of both the literature and information on the web, we were unable to 
find a case study that met these requirements. We hypothesize that such case studies are not 
available because commercial entities are very unwilling to advertise their security failures, and 
because considering security before system design (e. g., during requirements analysis) is new. 
1.62 Option 2 -Validation using Constructed Examples 
This form of validation requires one to construct a problem where security plays a role, then 
work through the example problem to show how the contributions presented in this thesis help 
identify security requirements. The only precondition is that the example shows how the 
contributions presented in this thesis arc used. We use this validation method in this thesis. 
Validating using constructed examples has the following strengths: 
1. The examples can be constructed to best illustrate the contributions. 
2. The contributions can be described in a tutorial fashion. 
3. The examples can be perturbed, if needed, to show alternative results. 
Using a constructed example has one significant disadvantage: the way the example is 
constructed may mask problems with the contributions that real examples would make evident. 
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To help minimize this risk and to provide us with a sanity check on our work, we have 
published the contributions in several peer-reviewed venues (see the next section). The 
criticisms received have helped enormously with filling in gaps in the contributions. 
1.63 Option 3 -Validation by Testing on a Live Project 
To validate by testing on a live project, one would in effect do the security requirements 
work twice, once in the way that the project had intended, and once using the contributions 
presented in this thesis. The results would then be compared. Successful use of this validation 
method has several preconditions: 
I. The project stakeholders must have identified security as a success factor for the project. 
2. The project schedule (start & finish) must be compatible with the PhD research timcline. 
3. The complexity of the project must be compatible with the resources available. 
4. The project must be willing to dedicate resources sufficient to use the framework presented 
in Chapter 5 and, in particular, the satisfaction arguments presented in Chapter 6. 
No industrial partner available to us had a project that met all the above conditions. In fact, no 
project met conditions 2 and 4. 
Given that no project met all the conditions, we decided to try to validate the contributions in 
a project that met some of the conditions, using a 'trial' approach as opposed to an experiment 
that compared the two outcomes. We assumed a consultancy-like role in one project that met 
conditions I and 3, and we were able to show that the contributions could be of value during the 
design phase; these results are presented in Chapter 7. Unfortunately, the project's duration 
prevented us from following the project to its completion, so we do not know what use the 
project made of the information we developed. 
1.7 Publication History of Contributions 
Much of the matcrial in this thcsis has bccn publishcd, primarily in intcmational vcnucs, with 
increasing levels of maturity. The publications were peer-reviewed, with the exception of three 
tcchnical rcports. 
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Trust assumptions, (Chapter 4) are described in (Haley, Laney, Moffett, & Nuseibeh, 2003, 
2004a, b, 2006a), and used in (Haley, Moffett, Laney, & Nuseibeh, 2005; Haley, Laney, 
Moffett, & Nuseibeh, 2006b). 
The security requirements framework (Chapter 5) was first described in (Moffett & 
Nuseibch, 2003) (a technical report), substantially elaborated in (Moffett, Haley, & Nuseibeh, 
2004) (a technical report), and further refined in (Haley, Moffett, Laney, & Nuseibeh, 2006). 
Synopses of the ideas in Chapter 5 have appeared in (Haley, Laney et al., 2003,2004a, b; Haley, 
Laney, & Nuseibch, 2004c; Haley, Moffett et al., 2005; Haley, Laney ct al., 2006a). Threat 
descriptions were introduced in (Haley, Laney et al., 2004c). 
Our work on security satisfaction arguments (Chapter 6) was first published in (Haley, 
Laney, & Nuscibeh, 2005) (a technical report), and substantially modified and elaborated in 
(Haley, Moffett et al., 2005; Haley, Laney et al., 2006b). 
We note that although the technical report (Moffett, Haley ct al., 2004) was not peer 
reviewed, it has had an impact, as evidenced by being cited by (at least) He (He, 2005), Mead, 
Hough ct al. (2005), and Redwine (2006). 
1.8 Structure of this Thesis 
This thesis comprises eight chapters. The first is this introduction. Chapter 2 provides 
background information relied upon in the following chapters. Chapter 3 presents related work, 
expanding upon the discussion in this chapter. Next, the three contributions are discussed, 
beginning in Chapter 4 with trust assumptions. Chapter 5 introduces our security requirements 
framework, describing the framework using a constructed example. A major part of the 
framework, our security satisfaction arguments, is presented in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 provides 
the industrial example described earlier, and Chapter 8 finishes with discussion, future work, 
and concluding remarks. 
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e'l 7. 
Chapter 2. Background 
Problem frames (Jackson, 2001) are used in this thesis to describe system context for security 
requirements, and to describe phenomena used in behavior specifications. This section presents 
some background information on problem frames, along with a discussion of requirements and 
specifications in a problem frames context. 
in addition, this chapter justifies the definitions of some terms used in this thesis, and 
provides some background material on parallel elaboration of requirements and architecture. 
2.1 Problem Frames 
Problem frames are used during problem analysis, providing mechanisms for describing the 
domains in a problem. When using problem frames, the analyst decomposes larger problems 
into a collection of smaller ones. These subproblems are later recomposed, providing the 
solution for the original problem. 
in a problem frames universe, a requirements engineer describes problems by describing the 
interaction of domains that exist in the world. The problem frames notation captures domains in 
a problem along with the interconnections between them. For example, assume that the 
requirements elicitation process for a box that protects documents from fire produces the 
requirement open thefireproof box when a door-open button is pushed. The clicitation process 
tells us that the stakeholders want a system consisting of (at least) a box, a door, and a button. 
25 
Chapter 2. Background 
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a: CM! MotorOpen b: PBIBuftonDown 
CMIMotorClose PBIBuftonUp 
CM'DoorlsOpen 
CMIDoorIsClosed 
Figure 2-1 -A basic Problem Frames diagram 
Figure 2-1 illustrates one set of domains that could satisfy the requirement: a basic automatic 
door system with three domains, two of which are given and one of which is to be designed. The 
first given domain, Door mechanism, is the box's door mechanism domain, capable of opening 
and shutting the box's door. The second given domain, Person + Button, is the one requesting 
that the door be opened; for convenience this domain includes both the button to be pushed and 
the human pushing the button. The third domain, control, is a designed domain, indicated by 
the two vertical lines in the box. It is the machine, the domain that will bridge the gap between 
the other two domains in order to fulfill the requirement that the door open when the button is 
pushed. The oval presents the requirement that the machine is to satisfy. 
In problem frames, every domain has interfaces, which arc defined by the phenomena visible 
to other domains. Phenomena (e. g., events and signals) are visible: they can be observed. The 
problem frames notation shows the phenomena shared between two domains on the line 
between the domains by labeling the line (the 'a' and 'b' in Figure 2-1). The label refers to a set 
of phenomena on the interface. Phenomena are controlled by one of the domains on the 
interface; the controlling domain is indicated by an abbreviation in front of an exclamation 
mark. For example, in Figure 2-1, the interface between the Person + Button domain and the 
Control Machine is labeled W. There are two phenomena on the interface, ButtonDown and 
ButtonUp, both controlled by the Person + Button domain as indicated by 'PB! '. The Control 
Machine controls the Boolean phenomena MotorOpen and MotorClose (turn on and off the 
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motor) on the interface between the machine and the Door Mechanism. The Door Mechanism 
controls the phenomena DoorlsOpen and DoorlsCloscd. 
One can think of domains as a set or as a class (a type). When a set, instances of the domain 
in the running system are members of the set, but might not all be the same type. This way of 
thinking is attractive in that it permits an object to be a member of multiple sets, which clearly 
happens in reality (a 'person' can be both a 'user' and an 'administrator'). Unfortunately, 
sometimes we want to talk about a class of objects (objects with particular attributes & 
properties), not one of a set (e. g., a particular authenticated user). To solve this problem, one can 
think of a domain as a class, where all the attributes & properties of interest arc defined by the 
class. When the system is realized (instantiated), objects that arc instances of the domain classes 
interact with each other, and these instances can be named. The downside of choosing the class 
point of view is that objects can be instances of more than one class, creating something like 
multiple inheritance. In this thesis, we use both schemes, as appropriate to the situation. 
Requirements are optative. They describe desired behavior (phenomena: inputs, outputs, and 
states visible at their interfaces) instead of existing behavior (Jackson, 200 1). Descriptions of the 
behavior of designed domains are both optative and indicative. A description is optativc in the 
description where the domain is being designed, but indicative when the designed domain is 
placed into a system. Descriptions of the behavior of given domains arc indicative; they 
describe an "objective truth" about the behavior of the domain. 
2.1.1 Requirements and Specifications 
According to Zave and Jackson (1997), a requirement is an optativc description of what the 
system is to do. Requirements describe a desired effect in terms of phenomena visible in the 
world. Jackson (2001) describes a requirement as "the effects in the problem domain that 
the machine is to guarantee. " 
Again referring to Zave & Jackson (1997), specifications are about phenomena across all the 
domains in a problem. The specification of an individual domain is a description of the behavior 
of the domain in terms of the interplay of its phenomena, indicative and optative, visible at its 
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interface. The term interplay incorporates the notions of sequencing: stimulus, response, and 
causality. The specification of a system is the collection of domain specifications that together 
permit the fulfillment of the requirement(s). 
The distinction between requirement and specification is an important one. A requirement 
does not describe how a system is to be implemented, but instead describes what is desired by 
the stakeholders in terms of phenomena visible at certain domains in the real world. it is the 
specification that describes how, in terms of the phenomena of all the domains in the system, the 
requirement is fulfilled. For example, the requirement "given a temperature input in Fahrenheit, 
the system shall display that temperature in Celsius" is describing some input phenomena on 
one domain (probably a keyboard) and some output phenomena of another domain: the display; 
these are the requirement phenomena. The rest of the phenomena in the system exist to make 
the system produce its output requirement phenomena, given its input requirement phenomena. 
Correctness arguments use this correspondence between requirements and specifications. To 
show that a system correctly satisfies the requirement, one must show that the interplay of 
specification phenomena causes the requirements phenomena to occur at correct points. if the 
phenomena are described formally, then the correctness argument can be a proof. If the 
phenomena are described informally, the correctness argument is equally informal. 
It is worth noting that Jackson has recently moved from correctness arguments to adequacy 
arguments (2006), which are very similar to the satisfaction arguments described in this thesis. 
When asked about this shift', Jackson explained that when the "real world" is involved, it is not 
possible to describe all possible behavior, especially in the face of failure, and therefore one 
cannot prove correctness. One instead ensures that an adequate number of cases have been 
considered, and argues why that set of cases is adequate. 
1 Personal communication between the author and Michael Jackson. 
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2.1.2 Indicative vs. Optative Descriptions 
Indicative domain properties are normally expected to be known and constant; the same 
stimulus in the same context produces the same response. This is what Jackson meant by 
"objective truth" (2001). Optative domain properties are those one wants; they do not exist yet. 
Unfortunately, when reasoning about security one should put aside the convenient "indicative 
properties" concept and assume that all domain properties are optative, because one way an 
attacker can succeed is by perturbing behavior of domains thought indicative. Consider the 
pushbutton in the domain shown Figure 2-1; when the button is pushed, the circuit connected to 
the button is closed. This would seem to be an indicative property. Now put some confidential 
information in the box, and then consider the same button from the point of view of an attacker. 
The attacker might cut the wire, connect an alternate or second button to the wire, or put a 
circuit in the middle that analyzes the context of the button push and either passes it on or does 
not. The property can no longer be considered objectively true. It has become optative: what one 
wants to be true, or alternatively what should be true. 
Security requirements are optative, describing characteristics of the system that the 
requirements engineer desires to be true. The lesson learned from the above discussion is that, 
unlike functional requirements, security requirements should assume that indicative domain 
properties are optative, because a goal of an attacker might be to change the behavior of some 
indicative phenomena. A successful attack means one of two things: that phenomena exist that 
were not described in the problem, or that behavior (the specification, or interplay of 
phenomena) assumed to be indicative (to be true), is not. 
2.2 Definitions 
Software engineering, security requirements, and security engineering have vocabularies that 
share many terms. Unfortunately, the terms do not always have the same meanings. To help 
avoid confusion, this section presents how some of the terms are used in this thesis. 
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2.2.1 Security and Safety 
As said in the introduction, this thesis is about security requirements. One question that 
frequently arises is whether we consider safety when considering security. There is a very close 
relationship between security and safety requirements. Both deal with system failures that lead 
to harm. Both deal with analysis of the context to look for evidence about how failures might 
occur. Both add requirements to reduce the possibility of, or to mitigate the effects of, these 
failures. We did not wish to consider safety in this thesis, and therefore we needed to find a way 
to define, or scope, our efforts so that they did not include safety, but equally so that safety 
would fit in a structure that also includes our contributions. In other words, we needed to find 
compatible definitions of safety and security. 
Some authors say the difference between security and safety is intention (e. g., (Firesmith, 
2003a; Jonsson, 1998; Leveson, 1986)), and we use this definition. Safety concerns harm caused 
by accident, while security concerns harm caused intentionally by an attacker. Failures of 
security can easily lead to safety concerns; consider placing a bomb on an airliner. Equally, 
failures of safety can lead to security concerns; consider an accident involving a truck carrying 
unencryptcd backup tapes. 
The use of intention as a discriminator is not universally agreed. For example, (Avizienis, 
Laprie, Randell, & Landwehr, 2004) defines security as "the absence of unauthorized access to, 
or handling of, system state. " The paper discusses the role of intention, but does not give it any 
particular emphasis. This differs from one of its predecessors, which recognizes that security is 
dominated by intentionally provoked faults (Laprie, 1992). The Safsec methodology (Lauticri, 
Cooper, & Jackson, 2005) combines safety and security, without introducing intention. The 
ITSEC defines security as "the combination of confidentiality, integrity and availability [Of 
information]" (Senior Officials Group - Information Systems Security, 1991: pg 115), a much 
more restricted view of security that does not include intention. 
There are several definitions for safety in the standards, and these definitions do not help 
disambiguate the terms. For example, Avizienis et al. define safety as the "absence of 
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catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the environment" (Avizienis, Laprie et al., 2004), 
a definition that could easily include security-related items such as integrity. IEC 615084 
defines safety as "freedom from unacceptable risk" (CENELEC, 2002: pg 11), a definition that 
certainly includes security. Both of these definitions are made clearer by including intention as a 
differentiator. 
Although we recognize that using intention as the differentiator between safety and security 
is sometimes uncomfortable, we feel that the distinction being made between intention and 
accident is helpful. It assists with setting bounds on both the context and the mitigations. 
Consider the possibility of failure of some component in an aircraft, potentially causing the 
aircraft to crash. Under our definition, this is a safety problem and therefore not considered in 
our analysis. However, if the component could be provoked to fail, then we have a security 
problem: preventing the (intentional) actions that could provoke the failure. 
2.2.2 Asset, Threat & Vulnerability 
These three words are used throughout the security literature, but not always with the same 
meaning. In this thesis, we use the definitions used by Chivers & Fletcher in (2005) (quoted 
here): 
* Asset: a resource of value to an organization (e. g., hardware, software, data, people). 
* Threat: a potential harm that could occur to an asset. 
o Vulnerability: a weakness in a system that allows an attack to realize a threat. 
These definitions are consistent with those found in (NIST, 1995) and (Mead, Hough et al., 
2005). 
These definitions are rather different from some proposed elsewhere. One definition has 
threats confounded with attacks and/or attackers. For example, Firesmith in (2004) dcfincs a 
threat as "a general condition, situation, or state (typically corresponding to the motivation of 
potential attackers) that may result in one or more related attacks. " ISO 15408, an information 
security standard, does not define the word 'threat', but it does characterize a threat by "A threat 
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shall be described in terms of an identified threat agent, the attack, and the asset that is the 
subject of the attack. " (ISO/IEC, 1999a: pg 45). 
For another definition, consider the definition in (Breu & Innerhofer-Oberperfler, 2005): "A 
Threat is defined as any event that can result in the violation of a Security Requirement. " Here, 
threats are defined in terms of security requirements, as opposed to defining security 
requirements in terms of threats. We do not use this definition because it leaves unsaid what is 
used to determine security requirements. 
The definitions we use have the advantage of clearly separating the concepts of asset, threat, 
attack, and vulnerability. One need not bring attackers and vulnerabilities into the discussion 
when considering what harm can follow some abuse of an asset. One can, but need not, 
speculate about the motivations of an attacker when considering whether a particular 
vulnerability would permit realization of some threat. 
The definitions are discussed further in Chapter 5. 
2.2.3 Validation & Verification 
As said in Chapter 1, this thesis is about obtaining adequate security requirements. Adequate 
requirements arc testable, in that sufficient criteria arc provided to establish that a system 
satisfies the requirements (e. g., the "fit criteria" in (Robertson & Robertson, 1999)). 
Establishing satisfaction of requirements is usually considered part of validation and 
verification, and therefore one prerequisite to accomplishing our goal is agreement on the 
definitions of the two terms; what validation and verification are. The purpose of this section is 
to present and justify the definitions we use for the terms. 
It is commonly held in the requirements engineering community that one should be able to 
determine whether a set of requirements accurately represent the goals/desires of the 
stakeholders, and to determine whether a delivered system satisfies the requirements. For 
example, one can determine whether the requirement When the user enters a temperature in 
Fahrenheit, the system shall display that temperature in Celsius is correct by asking the 
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stakeholders if this is indeed what they want the system to do. The constructed system is 
checked against the requirement by entering Fahrenheit values and seeing if the correct Celsius 
values are displayed. This process is an example of validation and verification, but it does not 
make clear which step is validation and which step is verification. 
Unfortunately, the literature does not provide a clear definition of the terms validation and 
verification. Boehm in (1984) informally defines validation as asking "are we building the right 
product", and verification as asking "are we building the product right", and Easterbrook in 
(1996) expands on these definitions, saying that "validation is concerned with checking that the 
system will meet the customer's actual needs, while verification is concerned with whether the 
system is well engineered". The IEEE Standard for Software Verification and Validation (IEEE, 
1998) defines the words in a way that permits them to be used almost interchangeably, but the 
notes on the definitions give more precision, saying that validation is "the process of examining 
a product to determine conformity with user needs" and verification is "the process of 
examining the result of a given activity to determine conformity with the stated requirement for 
that activity" (pg 71). Caughlin, writing about simulation, defines the terms similarly to these 
notes (2000). Pemberton & Sommerville, in a paper about testing, use (and justify) similar 
definitions (1997). 
Another example of the use the terms validation and verification is found in (Soudah, Pilch, 
Doebling, & Nitta, 2004). Quoting the relevant paragraph: "V&V is the multi-disciplinary 
process of demonstrating credibility in simulation results. Credibility is built by collecting 
evidence that a) the numerical model is being solved correctly and b) the simulation model 
adequately represents the appropriate physics. The former activity is called Verification and 
requires intimate knowledge of the mathematical model representing the physics, the numerical 
approximation derived from that model, software quality engineering (SQE) practices, and 
numerical error estimation methods. The latter, termed Validation is accomplished by 
comparing simulation output with experimental data and quantifying the uncertainties in both. 
Broad knowledge of modeling and experimentation, augmented with a deep understanding of 
statistical methods, are necessary for Validation. " Here, verification is the process of ensuring 
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that the software correctly implements the mathematical model of the world, and validation is 
the process of ensuring that the model accurately represents reality. In this definition, the model 
is clearly an intermediate artifact between the goals (and possibly requirements) and the 
software. One validates that the model satisfies the stakeholders' goal: that the model represent 
reality. One verifies that the model is satisfied by the software: that the software accurately 
implements the model. This usage is consistent with the Easterbrook quote in the above 
paragraph. 
Our definition of validation and verification is compatible with the examples in the above 
paragraphs. We first assume the existence of a hierarchy of activities; requirements are inferior 
to goals but superior to delivered software. Given this assumption, we define validation and 
verification by determining which direction in the hierarchy one is looking. We define 
verification as determining whether an activity in question is satisfied by the result of a 
hierarchically inferior activity. We define validation as determining whether an activity in 
question satis/1'es a hierarchically superior activity. 
To clarify, assume that some project has stakeholders (S) and a three-level hierarchy of 
constructed artifacts. Moving from outermost to innermost, level I is documented goals (G), 
level 2 is documented requirements (R), and level 3 is the delivered system (D). Verification is 
done by looking down the artifacts hierarchy: for example by checking whether R is satisfied by 
D. Validation is done by looking up the artifacts hierarchy: for example by checking whether R 
satisfies G. Our definitions arc consistent with the above discussion, and have the added 
advantage (for us) of fitting into a hierarchy within which artifacts are constructed. 
Note that because of the imprecision in the way artifacts are described, one must be careful 
about assuming that validation and verification are transitive. Verifying that (S is satisfied by G) 
and that (G is satisfied by R) does not necessarily verify that (S is satisfied by R). For example, 
assume that the stakeholders want a system to support a manufacturing process that uses gold 
for some reason. Gold is determined to be an asset, and the security goal Protect gol df rom 
thef t is added to the system. The goal does not include information about why there is gold in 
the system. Without that information, the goal could be operationalized by the requirement Gol d 
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shall be buried in very deep holes. This requirement satisfies the goal, and the goal 
satisfies the stakeholder. However, the requirement would almost certainly not satisfy the 
stakeholder, because the requirement does not satisfy the business goal. 
2.2.4 Functional and Non-Functional Requirements 
Requirements are often separated into two categories: functional requirements that describe 
what a system is to do, and non-functional requirements that describe some characteristic or 
quality the system is to have 2 ((Chung, Nixon et al., 2000) and many others). Functional 
requirements describe what a system does: they describe visible cffects in the world that the 
system lives in. Jackson describes requirements as the interplay of phenomena that one wishes 
to be visible at interfaces of a particular set of domains (real world objects) implicated in a 
system (2001). One domain, the machine, orchestrates the communication between domains so 
that the interplay of phenomena is exhibited. The requirements are validated by checking with 
the stakeholders that the interplay produces what they wish. The requirements arc vcrified by 
checking that the interplay takes place as specified. 
Non-functional requirements ((Chung, Nixon et al., 2000; van Lamswecrde, 2001) & many 
others), cover such areas as performance, stability, ease-of-use, and (traditionally) security. 
These requirements, also called quality requirements (e. g., (Firesmith, 2003b)), generally do not 
have clear criteria for determining if they have been satisfied; there is no clear mapping from the 
requirement to effects in the world (van Lamswccrde, 2001; Mylopoulos, Chung ct al., 1992). 
Validation and verification are problematic for quality requirements because yes/no validation 
and verification measurement criteria are hard to come by. Because of this difficulty, one must 
decide if a requirement has been satisficed (Mylopoulos, Chung ct al., 1992), or satisfied well 
enough, which opens the question of what well enough means. For example, it may be easy to 
produce a requirement that states clearly what the stakeholders desire (for validation) but is 
unclear about what the system is to do (for verification), or vice versa. Consider the 
requirement/goal the system shall be easy to use. This goal is easy to validate; the users can 
2 NFR's can also be requirements on the development process, but we leave that aside in this discussion 
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quickly say "Yes, I want that. " However, the goal is very difficult to verify, because it says 
nothing about what ease of use is in the context of the system, or how one can know whether the 
system has achieved it. The goal could be changed to be the system shall conform to the 
Common User Access standards. It is much easier to verify that this goal is satisfied by the 
system, but most users would have difficulty confirming that a system conforming to that 
requirement would in fact be easy to use. Somehow, an original validatable goal must be 
translated into visible and measurable behavior in the context of the system. Only then can one 
verify that the system indeed has the required behavior. 
2.3 Parallel Elaboration of Requirements & Architecture 
The Twin Peaks model (Nuseibeh, 2001a, b) shows that the elaboration of requirements and 
architecture should proceed in parallel, each influencing the other. The model proposes a partial 
development methodology wherein requirements and architecture (where architecture includes 
implementation) are simultaneously elaborated and verified against each other, bound together 
by the specification process. The model extends the spiral method (Boehm, 1988) by making 
elaboration of requirements an explicit part of the spiral. The benefits derived from the model 
include earlier understanding of the problem(s) being solved because architectural constraints 
are discovered earlier, rapid turn-around, inherent recognition and incorporation of project 
management concerns such as IKIWISI (I'll Know It When I See It), easier incorporation of 
reusable components such as COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) products, and rapid change in 
requirements and technology (Boehm, 2000). 
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Figure I (originally in (Nuselbeh, 2001 a), copied from (Haley & Nuscibeh, 2003)) illustrates 
how a project might move from idea to implementation while using Twin Peaks. The peaks 
represent the requirements and architecture artil'acts. The further one moves down a peak, the 
more detail is present and the more complete the artifact is. The spiral line represents the 
specification process, which is itself not an artifact but the simultaneous application of various 
and distinct methods to elaborate requirements and implementation. 
The need for iteration between requirements and architecture is doubly trLIe Ill the COIItCXt of 
security requirements, because as was shown in the spreadsheet example in Chapter 1, security 
is a systems-level problern. One cannot accurately determine the security requirements without 
the context of the systern, and the architecture of the systern is part of its context. I10 illustrate 
the idea, consider a trivial functional rcquircrnent husiness propmwls s/w// /)(, q0I., q 
electronicalýv using a. 1brinat defil7ed by the customer. In addition, assume the existence oftlic 
general security goal busine. vs proposal. v are to be treated ti. v inlol-III(Itioll. 
Without knowing the domains involved in the problem, how does one know lio\, k to keep the 
infonnation cont-idcntial'? One can postulate the existence ofcomputers used to writc 111cl store 
the proposals, but cannot go much further. The designer could choose to Put OIC MaChineS In a 
General 
SL)ecification 
Level 
of 
Requirements Architecture 
Detailed 
Independent Implementafion Dependent 
Dependence P, - 
Figure 2-2 - Ti%in Peaks 
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locked room, in which case the room key becomes a phenomenon in the problem and the 
security requirements must describe the constraints on obtaining and using a key. Alternatively, 
the designer might specify a client/server architecture in which the client machines are publicly 
accessible. In this case, the client machine domain can be physically accessed by anyone and the 
proposals are potentially visible where the client and server domains connect (the network). The 
security requirements must describe constraints on who can use the client machine and on who 
can see the information where the domains connect. 
When the requirements engineer attempts to build a correctness/satisfaction/adcquacy 
argument for some requirement, it could be that an acceptable argument cannot be constructed 
because there is not enough information available from the context. The requirements engineer 
would then request the designers to intervene, making (or applying already made) design 
decisions appropriate for the level of information available, changing the context by changing 
and adding phenomena and possibly domains. The requirements engineer starts again with the 
new context, attempting to construct acceptable arguments. This iteration continues until an 
acceptable argument is made. 
It is highly likely that applying a security requirement to a problem will alter the problem, 
possibly by changing phenomena, adding or removing domains in the existing problem, or both. 
For example, the specification to fulfill a security requirement information shared between the 
client and server domain must not be accessible to anyone must be evaluated in terms of visible 
phenomena. The designer must assure either that information shared between the domains is not 
visible outside the problem or that seeing what passes between the domains does not reveal the 
information. Either way, the physical properties of the connection need to be described. 
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Hindsight permits an examination of the literature using three lenses derived from the criteria 
listed in the Sections 1.1 - 1.3 of Chapter I of this thesis. Our first lens is the second criterion, 
assumptions about behavior: examining how context and assumptions are made expliCit3. Our 
second lens is the first criterion, clarity: how security requirements are defined and their 
meanings understood. Our last lens is the third criterion, satisfaction: using design rationale and 
argument capture for security requirements verification. 
3.1 Context & Assumptions 
This section examines the literature using the first lens, asking how the system context and 
assumptions are made explicit. 
For a security breach to occur, an attacker must make use of some entry point into a system 
to get to the assets. Given that the attacker is in the real world, the entry point must also be a 
rcal-world domain in the system (in the large, not just software). If no entry points cxist that an 
attacker can use, the system cannot be exploited. (Nor, probably, can it be used, but that is 
another problem). 
It is axiomatic that when an analyst constructs a context for a system, assumptions will be 
made about the behavior of domains in that context. Being a bit silly but making the point, even 
though the analyst believes that he or she is considering all the worst-casc scenarios where all 
defenses are inexplicably breached, the analyst almost certainly (and implicitly) assumes that 
the computer running the software is not hostile. One must have a special mind set, such as the 
one described in Programming Satan's Computer (Anderson & Needham, 1995), before 
I The second criterion is treated first to avoid some forward references. 
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everything would be assumed to be under the control of an enemy. On the other hand, the 
analyst might make implicit assumptions that are more problematic, such as "employees are 
always honest". In addition to exploring context, this section examines the literature by asking 
whether a representation for context should facilitate explicit capture of trust assumPtiOns; 
assumptions the analyst makes about trusting the stated behavior of domains. 
The section begins with a detailed look at context and assumptions in i* and its derivatives, 
then moves on to KAOS and SeDAn. It ends with a brief examination of other security 
rcquirements work. 
3.1.1 Thei*Framework 
The i* framework (Yu, 1997; Yu & Liu, 2001) takes an 'actor, intention, goal' approach, 
where security and trust relationships within the model are modeled as "softgoals": goals that 
have no quantitative measure for satisfaction. The i* framework incorporates the NFR 
framework, including related security work (Chung, 1993; Chung, Nixon et al., 2000). Liu et al. 
extended the framework to better support security and privacy by modeling the attacker as a 
malicious stakeholder (Liu, Yu, & Mylopoulos, 2003). Countermeasures, which are themselves 
(soft)goals, are added to thwart the attacker. 
The Liu ct at. work focuses on the attacker as the primary point of analysis (Liu, Yu ct al., 
2003). One finds vulnerabilities by asking what an attacker might wish to gain while playing 
some role, and then looking for ways that the attacker might achieve the wish. As i* is focused 
on the actor, it is difficult to explore side effects of an actor's actions in the real world. For 
example, one cannot easily model implicit connections between actors formed because of an 
actor's actions, such as leaving one's password on a post-it note or the effects of a laptop being 
stolen. 
P can be used to demonstrate the need for certain trust assumptions, specifically those that 
restrict which agents are permitted to play particular roles, and those that exclude the possibility 
of an agent exhibiting undesired behavior. There is, however, no convenient way to insert these 
trust assumptions into the model (beyond text annotations) without expanding the scope of the 
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analysis. For example, consider one of the countermeasures proposed in (Liu, Yu ct al., 2003): 
"User Authentication Mechanism". In the diagram, the countermeasure is a leaf task. The actors 
and mechanisms that support, provide, and rescind authentication credentials are not mentioned, 
but are clearly being trusted by the analyst to be correct. To make these trust assumptions 
explicit in the model, one must add the actors who administer authentication, a process that is by 
necessity highly recursive. 
The Tropos project uses the i* framework, adding wider lifecycle coverage. Tropos focuses 
on connecting agent-oriented architecture and development with i*, extending the i* model to 
describe the details of the agents' behaviors (Castro, Kolp, & Mylopoulos, 2001). A formal 
specification language was added in (Fuxman, Pistore, Mylopoulos, & Traverso, 2001). 
Security, represented as constraints on the interactions between two agents, was later added 
(Gani, Manson, Giorgini, & Mouratidis, 2003; Mouratidis, Giorgini, & Manson, 2003), 
extending the specification language to express these constraints and agent interaction 
dependencies. Architectural styles beyond agent-orientation are also discussed (Mouratidis, 
Giorgini et al., 2003). Trust and trust delegation were added (Giorgini, Massacci, Mylopoulos, 
& Zannone, 2004; Giorgini, Massacci, Mylopoulos, & Zannonc, 2005), along with appropriate 
extensions to the specification language. 
Although Tropos has significantly enhanced i*'s ability to represent security constraints and 
dependencies, and in particular confidentiality dependencies, it does not extend i*'s ability to 
represent trust assumptions made by the analyst about the real world. The authorization example 
described above also applies to Tropos; one finds authorization constraints and sub-goals in an 
early Tropos security paper (Mouratidis, Giorgini ct al., 2003), but one cannot explicitly 
indicate that administration of the authorization information is trusted, beyond extending the 
goal structure to include analysis of credential administration. One reasonable position is that 
some trust assumptions are implicit in the definitions and conditions of the formal modeling 
language (as can be said for KAOS below). 
Other work has extended i* in related directions. Gans et al. add distrust and intcr-agent 
communication ("speech acts") (Gans, Jarke, Kethers et al., 2001). Actors in the system decide 
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dynamically to trust or to distrust each other. Yu and Cysneiros have looked at privacy (2002), 
exploring how privacy requirements fit into an i* model. Both papers are concerned with 
analyzing trust relations between actors/agents in the running system, as opposed to capturing 
the requirements engineer's assumptions. 
Because i* and its derivatives do not model the real-world components of the system as 
it 
will eventually be built, certain classes of trust assumptions are difficult to make explicit. The 
best examples relate to unexpected connections between domains, such as information on paper 
passing through a mailroom, people hearing through walls, and security of backup media. 
Other 
examples can be found when looking at interactions between components on a system that are 
not P actors. 
The conclusion one reaches is that although i* works well for early requirements analysis and 
for actor/agent-based system analysis, it does not sufficiently represent general context and trust 
assumptions for security requirements analysis. 
3.1.2 KA OS 
KNOS MwKI&Ume, -4an Larnsweerde, & Fickas, 1993; van Larnsweerde, 2001), a goal- 
oriented requirements engineering method, uses obstacles to analyze security and safety (van 
Lamswccrde & Lcticr, 2000). An obstacle to some goal "is a condition whose satisfaction may 
prevent the goal from being achieved" (van Lamswcerde, 2004). A recent addition is anti-goals, 
a refinement of obstacles, to discover and close vulnerabilities (van Larnsweerde, Brohez, De 
Landtshccr, & Janssens, 2003; van Lamswecrde, 2004). One begins with a goal model for some 
system; the goal model includes a domain model expressed using temporal logic. Security goals 
for objects in the domain are enumerated using a catalog of general goals (e. g., confidentiality, 
integrity, etc. ). One inverts these goals to express the goals of some attacker (anti-goals), and 
then looks for vulnerabilities in the original domain model that permit the anti-goals to be 
realized. 
As in P, there are ways in KAOS to find and express some kinds of trust assumptions. One 
could argue that some expectations, which arc terminal goals under the responsibility of non- 
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software agents ((van Larnsweerde, 2004), referred to as assumptions in (van Larnsweerde, 
2001)), are expressions of trust assumptions, as the analyst is choosing to stop analysis at that 
point. Domain-specific axioms might also fall into the category of trust assumptions. For 
example, the authorized predicate described in (van Larnsweerde, 2004) is clearly depending 
upon knowing if an agent is an owner, a proxy, or a manager, but there is no expression of how 
it is known or managed, or what domain behavior permits it to be known. 
Using KAOS, one expresses security goals in terms of the vulnerability to be addressed. As 
noted by van Larnsweerde, not all vulnerabilities must be eliminated, but instead may be 
mitigated or ignored (van Lamsweerde, 2004). The choice varies with the context of the 
vulnerability - the level of harm being risked and the probability that the harm will occur. One 
creates goals that express the choices made for a particular vulnerability. Focusing on the 
vulnerability as opposed to the asset to be protected loses information explaining the 
provenance of the goal (the context of the vulnerability). Goal refinement further distances the 
goal from its source. This distance creates difficulty when considering whether the cost of 
satisfying a security goal in a particular context is justified by the risk presented by the 
vulnerability in that context. 
KAOS does not express context in terms of real-world domains, but instead expresses it in 
terms of goals, objects related to the goals, and actions needed to achieve the goals. Objects arc 
not necessarily physical domains. Behavior is expressed in terms of logical pre- and post. 
conditions on objects. The actual recognized and emitted stimuli (Phenomena) that permit the 
post-conditions to be satisfied are not recorded. As such, KAOS is a level removed from the real 
world. As the attacker is firmly placed in the real world, there is a mismatch between what the 
attacker manipulates and what KAOS models. 
3.1.3 SeDA n 
The SeDAn (Security Design -Analysis) method 
(Chivers & Fletcher, 2005), developed 
concurrently with (and independently of) the work described in this thesis, has many similarities 
with our work, incorporating an explicit notion of context and a definition of security 
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requirements as constraints. A SeDAn context is an information flow graph, mapping the flow 
of information assets from their source through a network of services running on a grid. The 
definition of 'services' includes the users of the services. Using an attack model, one looks for 
paths in the graph that attackers can exploit. Such "paths of attack" may be within a service 
(e. g., internal users), where services are connected (administrative or organizational 
boundaries), or where information is exposed to the external world. The goal is to show whether 
a path exists from an attacker to the information asset. Constraints (security requirements) are 
placed on services to block such paths. 
A SeDAn context is focused on information assets and software services running on a grid, 
using a UML description of the interconnection of services. The boundary of the system (it's 
'edge') is the user interface, and analysis is limited to vulnerabilities within this boundary. For 
example, bribing a user is not considered directly, because the user is outside the system 
boundary (Chivers & Fletcher, 2005: pg 878). 
Using SeDAn, an asset and threat analysis is done to determine the risk (including both 
likelihood and impact) that a path of attack can be utilized. One makes a table of the assets and 
the security concerns that affect the assets, noting the impact of the violation of the concern. 
Next, one determines which assets might be available through a given path of attack and the 
likelihood that the path of attack can be utilized in the undesired way. Impact and likelihood arc 
combined, resulting in a quantified value for risk. 
For risks considered serious enough, constraints are added that, when satisfied, will cause the 
path to be sufficiently blocked. The constraints are on deployment, system topology, behavior of 
a service, and external access. They act "as requirements for implementers ... ', (Ibid: pg 
882). 
ScDAn does not contain an explicit satisfaction argument for how the constraint sufficiently 
mitigates the risk, but does contain model checking to check that the system will satisfy the 
constraint. 
Chivcrs and Fletcher acknowledge that satisfying constraints can cause additional 
functionality to be added and that this new functionality "may include new assets and services, 
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and these in turn may have confidentiality or integrity concerns" (Chivers & Fletcher, 2005: pg 
887). However, they say neither how this iteration is structured within the process, nor how 
traceability back to the security concern that provoked the addition of functionality is 
maintained. 
3.1.4 Other Work 
He and Ant6n (2003) concentrate on privacy, working on mechanisms to assist trusting of 
privacy policies, for example on web sites. They propose a context-based access model. Context 
is determined using "purpose" (why is information being accessed), "conditions" (what 
conditions must be satisfied before access can be granted), and "obligations" (what actions must 
be taken before access can be granted). Their framework, like i*, describes properties desired at 
run-time, not the requirements engineer's assumptions about the domains forming the solution. 
Security requirements have been added to SCR (Heitmeyer, 2001) and to the WinWin 
framework (In & Boehm, 2001). As with i* and KAOS, one can locate some trust assumptions 
in both SCR and WinWin by looking for where the analyst stopped. The implicit decision to 
limit the context almost certainly has some number of trust assumptions behind it. 
Several people have described techniques that assist with reasoning about security by 
postulating the existence of an attacker who attempts to exploit the system in a way that will 
cause harm. Sindre and Opdahl introduced the idea of misuse and misactors into use cases to 
identify potential security flaws in a system (2000). Their work concentrated on simplicity, 
using the diagrams as a communications tool and saying that "misuse diagrams must only be 
seen as a support for eliciting threats". Alexander extended the relations over those presented by 
Sindre et al., adding mitigation and restriction (2002a; 2002b). McDermott ct al. described 
abuse cases, concentrating on exploring the details of an exploit and documenting the route and 
expertise needed to be successful (McDermott & Fox, 1999; McDermott, 2001). All of these 
techniques employ use cases, an actor/action model, so they have many of the same 
representation problems as i*. In these cases, an analyst's trust assumptions arc implicit in the 
diagrams, and not made explicit. One can argue that the very choices of which cases to analyze 
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constitute trust assumptions, because the analyst is choosing which interactions are important. It 
is worth noting that although these techniques do not capture trust assumptions in some explicit 
way, they would be quite useful for testing validity of the satisfaction arguments built using 
trust assumptions. 
Srivatanakul ct al. combined use cases with risk analysis techniques taken from safety 
(Srivatanakul, Clark, & Polack, 2004), specifically HAZOP (Kletz, 1999; McDermid, 
Nicholson, Purnfrey, & Fenelon, 1995). They extended the abuse and misuse case work 
discussed above ((Alexander, 2002a, b; McDermott & Fox, 1999; McDermott, 2001; Sindre & 
Opdahl, 2000)) by adding HAZOP 'guideword'-driven analysis of use cases to find potential 
abuses. One uses the guidewords to find deviations for the elements in a use case (e. g., actors, 
associations, event flow, pre- and post-conditions). These deviations represent potential 
violations of "security properties" of a system. If a security property is (potentially) violated, the 
deviation represents a (potential) successful attack. One locates the vulnerabilities that were 
exploited, then takes appropriate steps to close or mitigate the vulnerabilities. The method, like 
misuse cases, abuse cases, and abuse frames (Lin, Nuseibeh, Ince ct al., 2003), takes what might 
be considered a bottom-up approach; the methods locate vulnerabilities that lead to security 
requirements that, if satisfied, will ensure the closure of the vulnerabilities. If no vulnerabilities 
are found, then the satisfaction argument has been bolstered. Finally, the technique employs use 
cases and therefore has many of the same representation problems as i*. 
Some of the work in the aspcct-oricnted requirements engineering (AORE) community is 
related to identification of security requirements. Yu ct al. proposed an extension to j* to model 
softgoals, including security softgoals, as aspects (Yu, Leite, & Mylopoulos, 2004). Rashid et 
al. propose that ideas from aspect-oricrited software development can be used when mapping 
non-functional requirements onto functional requirements (Rashid, Sawyer, Moreira, & Ara6jo, 
2002; Rashid, Moreira, & Araujo, 2003). They start by identifying the non-functional 
requirements (NFRs) that affect more than one functional requirement, determine what the 
effect of the overlap is, then model the composition of the requirements. In their work, security 
is treated identically to other NFRs. Context and assumptions arc not taken into account. 
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Brito and Moreira (2004) propose that non-functional requirements from an NFR catalog 
(Chung, Nixon et al., 2000), be integrated with functional requirements using a composition 
process. The composition process connects security goals with functional requirements and 
permits supplying a priority for satisfaction arguments, but does not aid with the construction of 
these arguments. None of this work incorporates capture of the assumptions made by a 
requirements engineer when specifying a system. 
3.2 Expressing Security Requirements 
This section examines the literature through our second lens: how security requirements are 
defined and their meanings understood. We look from the point of view that to be most useful, 
security requirements should have the following characteristics of functional requirements: they 
should be unambiguous, verifiable, and free of conflicts. In addition, given general security 
goals, there should be a clear pathway to finding security requirements. 
If the security requirements cannot be verified (recall that verification looks down the 
hierarchy, in this case to establish that requirements are satisfied by the system), then one 
cannot know if the system is appropriately secure. This problem often ariscs when security 
requirements are expressed in ambiguous or overly general terms, such as "the system must be 
secure" and "only authorized users can use the system. " Verifying the system against these 
requirements requires one to guess at their meaning. The developers must somehow determine 
what 'secure' means, who is a 'user', what users are authorized to do, and when they are 
authorized to do it. What is needed is a way of expressing security requirements that avoids 
these problems. 
The need for avoiding and resolving conflict in security goals and requirements can be 
illustrated by considering two stakeholder groups in a health care system: physicians and 
regulatory compliance officers. Physicians have a duty of care; they arc morally and in some 
cases legally obliged to provide adequate care. They will demand from a systcm what they 
consider sufficient functionality and privilege needed to carry out their duties. We see from 
Anderson's report (1996) that one privilege physicians frequently expect is to be able to discuss 
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a case with some other physician. However, privacy regulations require patient consent before 
disclosure of information report (Anderson, 1996; Mouratidis, Giorgini et al., 2003). Regulatory 
compliance officers are charged with ensuring the respecting of privacy regulations, meaning 
that physicians must not share information with other physicians until the patient gives his or 
her consent. We find here a conflict of duties (duty of care vs. duty of compliance) that will 
affect who has which privileges in a system. However, the system, s requirements in this 
instance must be free of conflicts, because if not, the implementers may resolve the conflicts in 
potentially inconsistent and incorrect ways. The conflict between rival stakeholders must be 
resolved by the production of an agreed set of security requirements. 
3.2.1 Security Requirements as Security Functions 
It is common to express security requirements by describing the security mechanisms to be 
used. For example, ISO 15408 (ISO/IEC, 1999a, b, c), a security specification that is the ISO 
version of the Common Criteria (Common Criteria Sponsoring Organizations, 2006a, b, c), 
provides examples of security requirements of the form (somewhat paraphrased) "The [ ... I 
Security Function (TSF) shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [rules 
... ]" (ISO/IEC, 1999b: pg 48), where "rules" appear to be a mechanism. Regarding encryption, 
one finds "The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a [specified 
cryptographic key distribution method] that meets the following: [list of standards]" Gbid: pg 
39). Again, a mechanism is being described. In addition, both examples say what the function is 
to do, not the purpose it is to accomplish. 
The NIST Computer Security Handbook states that "These [security] requirements can be 
expressed as technical features (e. g., access controls), assurances (e. g., background checks for 
system developers), or operational practices (e. g., awareness and training)" (NIST, 1995: Pg 
80), in effect defining security requirements in terms of functions and practices. Other security 
guides imply that recommendations such as "Acquire Firewall Hardware and Software" (e. g., 
(Allen, 2001)) are requirements. 
48 
3. Z Expressing Security Requirements 
Defining requirements in terms of function leaves out key information: what objects need 
protecting and, more importantly, why the objects need protecting. Although both the ISO and 
NIST documents say that the underlying reasons why objects are to be protected come from the 
functionality of the system, they provide little guidance on how to connect the functionality to 
the security needs. Instead of describing when and why objects are to be protected, they describe 
what mechanisms are to be used to protect the objects. 
It should be noted that the ISO and NIST guides are excellent sources of state-of-thc-practice 
security mechanisms. The requirements engineer would be well advised to consider the 
functions described in these documents as excellent pointers to areas in a system that could 
participate in security satisfaction arguments (see Chapter 6). 
3.2.2 Security Requirements as Non-functional Requirements 
Dcvanbu & Stubblebine (2000) remark that security requirements arc a kind of non. 
functional requirement. Kotonya and Sommerville (1998), when discussing non-functional 
requirements, in which they include security, define them as "restrictions or constraints" on 
system services. Similar definitions can be found in other textbooks. Rushby (2001) appears to 
take a similar view, stating "security requirements mostly concern what must not happen". 
Using the Tropos methodology, Mouratidis, Giorgini et al. state that "security constraints def inc 
the system's security requirements" (2003). Chung explicitly defines information security 
requirements as non-functional requirements (Chung, 1993; Chung, Nixon ct al., 2000). 
Firesmith defines security requirements as "a quality requirement that specifics a required 
amount of security [ ... ] in terms of a system-specific criterion and a minimum level [ ... ] that is 
necessary to meet one or more security policies. " (Firesmith, 2003a, 2004). This appears to be a 
form of constraint, an impression reinforced by an example he provides: "The [application] shall 
protect the buyer-related data ( ... ] it transmits from corruption [ ... ] due to unsophisticated 
attack [when] [ ... ] Buyer Buys Item at Direct Sale [to a level ofl 99.99%. 11 
The problem with these definitions is their lack of specificity and guidance for the designers. 
What "system services" are being constrained? What effect will the constraint have on the 
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functionality of the system? How can any eventual chosen constraint be validated to ensure that 
it accurately reflects the stakeholders' wishes? Referring to Firesmith's example, what is an 
"unsophisticated attack? " What does the measure "99.99%" mean? It could mean that if 10,000 
attacks arc known, the developers can ignore one. Alternatively, it could be a way of saying 
"all" without actually saying it. 
One major problem with percentage-style quantification of security requirements is the 
binary nature of the majority of security attacks; in most cases, an attack works or it does not. If 
an attack does not work the first time, it probably will not work the second time unless the 
parameters of the attack or the system state are changed. Anti-intrusion measures such as 
account lockout help ensure that attacks following a failed attack attempt will have a lower 
probability of success. On the other hand, if the attack works once (the system is penetrated), 
then the attack will likely continue to work until the vulnerability is removed. Successful attacks 
can (usually) be repeated as often as the attacker wishes, and even shared amongst attackersý. In 
high-threat situations, a successful attack will almost certainly occur (Redwine, 2006: pg 80). It 
is difficult to know what the percentage quantification means in these cases. 
Although we agree with defining security requirements as constraints, we argue that two 
precisions are necessary: a more precise definition and representation of constraints, and a way 
of moving from business goals to constraints. 
3.2.3 Security Requirementsfrom Privacy & Trust 
Some researchers look at security from the point of view that if an agent can trust that 
information it 'owns' is kept private, then security goals will be met. De Landtsheer proposes 
modeling which properties that agents, authorized or not, can know (De Landtsheer & van 
Lamswccrdc, 2005). The Tropos project (Giorgini, Massacci ct al., 2005 and several others) 
takes a similar view, but extended to include agents' intentions and explicit trust delegation. 
4 One example is "script kiddie" attacks, where an experienced attacker produces toolkits for inexperienced attackers to use. 
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Breaux Vail, and Ant6n (2006) extract privacy rights and obligation information from "policy 
documents" to assist with development of security requirements. 
These approaches work well in contexts and problems dominated by privacy concerns. They 
are less effective when considering vulnerabilities in a system context. They are also less 
effective in applications where privacy (c. f. confidentiality) is not the dominant concern. The 
example in Chapter 7 is one such case. Air traffic control is dominated by integrity and 
availability concerns; high confidence is needed that airplanes are where they say they are. 
3.2.4 Other Portrayals ofSecurity Requirements 
Many authors implicitly assume that security requirements are identical to high-level security 
goals. Tettero et al are explicit about this, defining security requirements as the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the entity for which protection is needed (Tcttero, Out, Frankcn, & 
Schot, 1997). While this is a clear definition, in some cases it may not result in precise enough 
requirements. In the above example, both doctors and the administrators would probably agree 
on the importance of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the clinical information, but 
they would disagree on the concrete security requirements that express those goals. The 
requirements need to be more explicit about who can do what, when. 
Some authors identify security requirements with security policies. Dcvanbu & Stubblebine 
(2000) define a security requirement as "a manifestation of a high-level organizational policy 
into the detailed requirements of a specific system. [... We] loosely (ab)use the term 'security 
policy, [ ... 
] to refer to both 'policy' and 'requirement"'. Anderson (2001) is less direct; he states 
that a security policy is "a document that expresses [ ... ] what [ ... ] protection mechanisms are to 
achieve" and that "the process of developing a security policy [ ... ] is the process of 
requirements engineering". Redwine (2006) reports that the "software system security policy is 
part of software system requirements placing constraints on system behavior". The difficulty 
with security policies is their chameleon-like meaning. As the discussion above shows, the term 
can be used for anything from a high-level aspiration to an implementation. Therefore, without 
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accompanying detailed explanation, it is not satisfactory to define security requirements as 
security policies. 
Lee et al. (Lee, Lee, & Lee, 2002) point out the importance of considering security 
requirements in the development life cycle, but do not define them. ISO/lEC 15408 (ISO/IEC, 
1999c) does not dcfine security requirements in its glossary. However, in one place, they arc 
depicted as being at a higher level than functional requirements, but in another as "security 
requirements, such as authorization credentials and the IT implementation itself,, which appears 
to be at too low a level. Heitmeyer (2001) shows how the SCR method can be used to specify 
and analyze security properties, without giving the criteria for distinguishing them from other 
system properties. 
A number of papers have focused on security requirements by describing how they may be 
violated. For example, McDermott & Fox (1999), followed independently by Sindre & OpJahl 
(2000) and elaborated by Alexander (2003), describe abuse and misuse cases, extending the use 
case paradigm to undesired behavior. Liu, Yu & Mylopoulos (2003) describe a method of 
analyzing possible illicit use of a system, but omit the important initial step of identifying the 
security requirements of the system before attempting to identify their violations. One could 
argue that Chivers and Fletcher (2005) are in this camp with SeDAn, as they focus on attackers 
and the paths they might take into a system. One consequence of these approaches is that they 
indicate what a system is not to do in specific situations, but not in the general case. General 
security requirements must be inferred from the list of undesirable situations. 
Van Larnsweerde (2004) describes a process by which security goals are made precise and 
refined until reaching security requirements; see section 3.1.2 for more detail. Ant6n & Earp 
(2001) use the GBRAM method to operationalize security goals for the generation of security 
policies and requirements, but do not define security requirements. 
Mead et al. in the SQUARE methodology (2005) describe security requirements as being at 
the system level or the software level. They do not define what requirements are, beyond saying 
that "Requirements are concerned with what the system should do". They also introduce the 
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notion of "architectural constraints" that specify "how it should be done, " leaving open how one 
distinguishes between a constraint that a system use an existing authentication system and a 
requirement that the system support authentication in a given context. Our framework fits well 
within SQUARE, providing a pathway from goals to requirements, and making the 
requirements (or constraints) implied by the context clear. 
3.3 Use of Design Rationale and Argument Capture for Verification 
Our third lens, the use of design rationale and argument capture for security requirements 
verification, is used in this section. 
The work presented in this thesis is related to, and builds upon, research on design rationale 
and argument capture, on safety requirements analysis, and more generally on ideas behind 
problem domain analysis. 
3.3.1 Design Rationale 
Design rationale is principally concerned with capturing how one arrived at a decision, 
alternate decisions, or the parameters that went into making the decision (Lee & Lai, 1991). For 
example, Buckingham Shurn focuses on how rationale (argument) is visualized, especially in 
collaborative environments (2003). Potts and Bruns (1988), and later Burge and Brown (2004) 
discuss capturing how decisions were made, which decisions were rejected, and the reasons 
behind these actions. Mylopoulos et al. (Mylopoulos, Borgida, Jarke, & Koubarakis, 1990) 
present a way to represent formally knowledge that was captured in some way, without focusing 
on the outcome of any decisions. Ramesh and Dhar (1992) describe a system for "capturing 
history in the upstream part of the life cycle. " Fischer, Lemke et al. (1996) suggest that the 
explicit process of argumentation can itself feed into and benefit design. Finkelstein and Fuks 
(1989) suggest that the development of specifications by multiple stakeholders who hold 
disparate views may be achieved through an explicit dialogue that captures speech acts, such as 
assertions, questions, denials, challenges, etc. The representation of the dialogue is then a 
rationale for the specifications constructed. The common element in all of the above work is the 
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capture over time of the thoughts and reasons behind decisions. Whether the decisions satisfY 
the needs is not the primary question. 
When analyzing security requirements, the ultimate goal is to convince a reader that the 
security requirements can be satisfied, and that nothing is omitted that could result in the 
requirements not being satisfied. The process used is relevant only as it relates to completeness. 
Optimality is not part of the argument. Of course, we make no claim that it is useless to have the 
history that led to the final arguments; such a history will certainly be useful if the arguments 
fail to convince, or if the situation changes. ' 
3.3.2 Safety Cases 
Kelly (1999) argues that "a safety case should communicate a clear, comprehensive and 
defensible argument that a system is acceptably safe to operate in a particular context. " He goes 
on to show the importance of the distinction between argument and evidence. An argument calls 
upon appropriate evidence to convince a reader that the argument holds. 
Attwood and Kelly (2004) use the same principles, taking the position that argument forms a 
bridge between requirements and specification, permitting capture of sufficient information to 
realize rich traceability. Combining the two ideas, argument for safety cases and using 
arguments for traceability, Kellys quote presented above is paraphrased as "a security 
satisfaction argument should communicate a clear, comprehensive, and defensible argument that 
a system is secure enough to operate in its context. " 
The techniques proposed by Kelly are not directly applicable to security without 
modification, primarily because the techniques are focused around objective evidence, 
component failure, and accident; rather than subjective reasoning, subversion, and malicious 
intent. 
3.3.3 Problem Domain Analysis 
Zave and Jackson in (1997), and Jackson in (2001), argue that one should construct a 
correctness argument for a system, where the argument is based on known and desired 
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properties of the domains involved in the problem. To quote Jackson, "Your [correctness] 
argument must convince yourself and your customer that your proposed machine will ensure 
that the requirement is satisfied in the problem domain. " This position is the same as Kelly's, 
with the proviso that Kelly's arguments focus equally on all domains, with no special emphasis 
on the machine. 
Correctness arguments apply to security requirements, with a significant distinction. It is very 
difficult to talk about correctness when discussing security. One can convince the reader that the 
proposed system mcets the needs, but it is far more difficult to prove that the system is correct. 
The distinction between convince and prove (or show) is important. It is not possible to prove 
the negative - that violations of security goals do not exist - but one can be convincing that 
sufficient outcomes have been addressed. 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
The review of the literature shows that our three criteria for adequate security requirements 
are not yet adequately satisfied by existing work. To reiterate, our criteria arc: 
1. Clarity: one must have a clear understanding of what security requirements mean, and their 
effects within the system context in which they apply. 
2. Incorporation ofassumptions about behavior: security requirements must take into 
consideration an analyst's implicit or explicit decisions to trust behavior of objects found in 
the system. 
3. Satisfaction: one must be able to determine whether the security requirements satisfy the 
security goals, and if the system can satisfy the requirements. 
Our contributions flow directly from a desire to satisfy all the criteria. To satisfy the first 
criterion, we propose a framework for security requirements engineering explicitly 
incorporating system context. To satisfy the second, we propose the use of trust assumptions in 
security requirements. To satisfy the third, we propose combined formal/informal security 
requirements satisfaction arguments. 
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Recall that a system comprises not only software, but also all the diverse constituents needed 
to achieve its purpose. For example, a computing system clearly includes the computers, but 
also incorporates real-world elements such as the people who will use, maintain, and depend on 
the system; the physical and logical environment within which the system will exist; and any 
systems already in place. When operating in a systems context, the requirements engineer must 
determine which real-world elements are to be included in the analysis. The analyst must def-ine 
the context within which requirements analysis takes place by selecting the domains (the 
aforementioned real-world constituents) that are considered pertinent (Jackson, 1995,2001). In 
doing so, the analyst reduces the size of the context to those domains relevant to the problem. 
As explained in Chapter 1, one factor influencing an analyst's choice about whether or not a 
domain is relevant to a system's security, and therefore to be included in the context, is the 
analyst's set of trust assumptions. Trust assumptions are explicit or implicit choices not to 
challenge some described characteristics of domains, and can have a significant impact on the 
security of a system. To repeat the example from Chapter 1, most analysts implicitly assume 
that the compiler is not a security risk; it would not occur to them to include it in the analysis. 
Thompson demonstrated that this assumption is not necessarily justified by showing how a 
compiler could introduce trapdoors into applications (1984). Thompson's example and the other 
in Chapter I illustrate how the requirements engineer's implicit trust of some domains in the 
environment can introduce unknown amounts of risk into the system. 
Although these examples demonstrate the need to capture and analyze trust assumptions, 
little exploration has been done on how to find, represent, and quantify them; and then to 
analyze their effect on the system under discussion. We correct this omission by first providing 
a better understanding of what trust assumptions are, and then by making explicit their place 
57 
Chapter 4. Thist Assumptions 
within satisfaction arguments. This chapter provides the former, a better understanding, bY 
examining trust assumptions as independent artifacts used in very informal argumentation. 
Chapter 6 presents the latter, putting them into the context of satisfaction arguments. 
4.1 Definition of Trust Assumptions 
We define a trust assumption as a choice made by a requirements engineer to depend upon a 
domain having certain properties, in order to satisfy a security requirement. The requirements 
engineer trusts the assumption to be true. These assumed properties act as domain restrictions; 
they restrict the domain in some way that contributes to the satisfaction of the security 
requirement. 
4.1.1 Purpose of Trust Assumptions 
The requirements engineer is responsible for constructing an argument that security 
requirements arc satisfied - the satisfaction argument. In most cases, the satisfaction argument 
cannot be made without depending on domain properties that cannot be vcrified with the 
information available in the context. The requirements engineer has a choice: either add a trust 
assumption that asserts that the properties arc valid, or expand the scope as necessary to verify 
the properties, which is a highly recursive process. By choosing to add a trust assumption, the 
requirements cnginccr ends the recursion and explicitly limits the scope of the analysis. 
To illustrate making the choice to expand the scope or adding a trust assumption, assume the 
existence of a security requirement stipulating that the computers operate for at least eight hours 
in the event of a power failure (an availability requirement). The requirements engineer, 
working with the designers and the stakeholders, can satisfy this requirement by adding backup 
generators to the system. Appropriate phenomena would be added so that the machine can 
detect the power loss, control the generators, detect going beyond eight hours, etc. In most 
situations, the requirements engineer can trust the manufacturer of the generators to supply 
equipment that does not intentionally permit an attacker to take control of the generators and 
prevent them from operating (a denial of service attack). The analyst trusts the behavior of the 
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generators, and adds a trust assumption to that effect. By adding the trust assumption, the 
requirements engineer does not need to include the manufacturer of the generators in the 
analysis. The analyst uses the trust assumption to limit the scope of the analysis. 
As explained above, trust assumptions contribute to the satisfaction of security requirements. 
There is not necessarily a one-to-one coffespondence between a trust assumption and the 
security requirements satisfied. Several trust assumptions may be necessary to satisfy a security 
requirement (an and decomposition), any one of several trust assumptions may be sufficient to 
satisfy a security requirement (an or decomposition), or some combination of the two. In 
addition, one trust assumption may play a role in satisfying multiple security requirements. 
4.1.2 The 'Trust'in Trust Assumptions 
We must first define what we mean by trust in trust assumptions. We use a variant of the 
definition of trust proposed by Grandison & Sloman (2003): "[Trust) is the quantified belief by 
a trustor with respect to the competence, honesty, security and dependability of a trustee within 
a specified context". In our case, the requirements engineer trusts some domain to participate 
6competently and dependably' in the satisfaction of a security requirement in the context of the 
problem. 
In the Grandison & Sloman definition, the quantification of trust represents the level of 
confidence that the trust assumption is valid. Said another way, the quantification represents the 
risk that including the trust assumption, and thereby limiting the scope of analysis, may not be 
justified. In this thesis, the quantification is binary; the trust assumption is thought to be valid, 
or it is not. 
The Thompson (1984) example in the introduction gives us an example of a trust assumption. 
An analyst's (probably implicit) trust of the compiler vendor not to include trapdoor generators 
in the compiler may be misplaced. If the compiler has been compromised, then some number of 
vulnerabilities may exist, such as the existence of a universal password, denial-of-scrvicc traps, 
or information leaks. Successful attacks using these vulnerabilities will have some impact on the 
organization: they will cause harm. The organization must decide whether the risk presented by 
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the vulnerabilities that might come into existence if the trust assumption is not valid is sufficient 
to justify the time and expense of the expansion of the analysis required to verify the compiler. 
The risk presented by a trust assumption is not the same as the risk associated with a 
vulnerability that might exist if the trust assumption is not valid. The risk presented by a trust 
assumption measures how likely it is that the vulnerability might exist if the trust assumption is 
invalid. The risk associated with a vulnerability measures the likelihood that the vulnerability 
can be successfully exploited, along with the impact of a successful exploit. As the example in 
the previous paragraph shows, the two measures are independent. If a compiler has been 
compromised to modify the password checker of the login program (the case described by 
Thompson), the trust assumption is invalid and the risk of the existence of a vulnerability is 
high. However, if the login program is not used in a system, then the risk presented by the 
vulnerability is nil, regardless of the validity of a trust assumption stating that the compiler 
vendor can be trusted. 
A discussion of formal risk analysis is outside the scope of this thesis, and will not be farffier 
discusscd. 
4.1.3 Representation of Trust Assumptions 
A trust assumption consists of the following information: 
e Identification of the dependent domain. The trust assumption restricts this domain. 
Effect of the trust assumption. The trust assumption a) restricts instances of the domain to 
be instantiations of some class or members of some set, b) restricts phenomena on the 
interfaces of the domain, or c) some combination of the two. Note that phenomena 
restrictions can be an assertion that some phenomena will not appear on the interface, or 
will only occur in a specific scqucncc/interchange. 
Narrative description of the rcstriction(s). If the trust assumption restricts the instances of a 
domain type, then describe the attributes of instances of the domain type before and after 
application of the restriction (in effect, a description of the subtype). If the trust assumption 
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restricts phenomena, then describe the restriction and its effect on the valid interplay of 
phenomena. At this point, when discussing the validity and effect of the restrictions in this 
section, the analyst should take the position that the trust assumption is valid. 
Preconditions. Some trust assumptions may be considered valid only if some other 
conditions are true. Some examples might be the earlier application of some other trust 
assumption to the dependent domain and/or the existence of domains not otherwise 
included in the analysis. 
Justification for the inclusion of the trust assumption. This is not a justification of the 
restrictions, but is instead an informal discussion of why the trust assumption should be 
considered valid. If there are risks associated with the trust assumption, they should be 
listed and discussed. 
9 List of security requirements (the constraints) that this trust assumption satisfies partially 
or completely. A trust assumption participates in satisfaction of a security requirement is 
by appearing in a satisfaction argument for that requirement. 
4.1.4 Trust Assumptions as Domain Restrictions 
Trust assumptions either restrict instances of a domain to some subtype, restrict the 
phenomena that a domain can produce, or both. To illustrate restricting instances of a domain's 
type, consider a company's door security system. By restricting entrance to pcople who pass the 
system's test (whatever that is), the system in effect changes the type of the domain from People 
to Employees. To illustrate restricting phenomena, consider the output of the balance enquiry 
function of an ATM. The analyst might assume that the ATM displays the information for the 
account indicated by the card, not some other account. The trust assumption is that no dcfccts 
exist that would cause the ATM to display information for some other account. 
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4.2 Worked Example 
The Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) Specifications (Secure Electronic Transaction LLC, 
1997a, b, c) describe a set of mechanisms intended to provide an acceptable level of security for 
on-line purchasing. This worked example looks at incorporating the SET specifications into 
software to support cardholder-side payment authorization. There is one functional requirement 
(in the problem frames sense): Complete the Purchase. This example considers one asset, 
Customer Account Information (CAI), and one derived security goal Purchases shall be 
authorized. Several trust assumptions are derived during the analysis. 
To derive the trust assumptions, we first determine what actions might cause harm, then 
negate these actions to express the security requirements (the constraints). (Describing threats is 
described further in Chapter 5. ) Two such action/harms are used in this example: exposure Of 
cardholder account information could lead to financial loss (from the confidentiality concern), 
and unauthorized use of cardholder credentials could lead to financial loss (from the integrity 
concern). We next add security requirements (constraints) to the requirements: 
SR1: only authorized individuals may use the cardholder credentials. 
and 
SR2: only authorized users may see the cAi 
The trust assumptions needed to satisfy the security requirements will be described in a later 
section. 
4.2.1 SET Overview 
SET describes a series of operations between players in an electronic purchase transaction 
using a credit card. In SET, a cardholder requests a cryptographic certificate from a certiji'cate 
authority (CA). The CA vcrifics that the cardholder has a credit card account with an issuer, and 
then supplies a certificate. The cardholdcr can subsequently use the certificate to make 
purchases from a merchant. The merchant uses a payment gateway to pass the transaction to the 
acquirer (the merchant's bank) for collection. The acquirer normally operates the payment 
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Figure 4-1 - Simplified SET processing flows 
gateway. Figure 4-1 presents a simplified version of the SET "processing flows" (terminology 
from (Secure Electronic Transaction LLC, 1997c)), showing the players and the messages they 
interchange. The arrows represent the direction of the flow of a message. The numbers in the 
boxes indicate sequence. Several SET messages and fields that do not have a direct bearing on 
this discussion have been omitted from the diagram, in particular the obtaining of certificates 
and private keys, and the initial verification of cardholder information. In addition, the diagram 
shows the merchant using the CAI, which although optional in SET is the technique that the 
SET specifications claims will be the most often used. (Secure Electronic Transaction LLC, 
1997b: pg 14) 
4.2.2 SET-Identified Security Assumptions 
The SET specifications make the following security-related assumptions about the SET 
environment relevant to this worked example. They are relevant because they point us at 
vulnerabilities considered by the writers of the SET specifications. 
SAI: The cardholder ensures that no one else has access to his/her private key. (Sccurc 
Electronic Transaction LLC, 1997c: pg 16) In particular, SET software vcndors shall 
Gtensure that the certificate and related information is stored in a way to prcvcnt 
unauthorized access. " (Ibid: pg 46) 
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Figure 4-2 - Purchase problem 
SA2: Cardholder, merchant, and payment gateway machines are free of viruses and trojan 
horses, and are not susceptible to being hacked. (Secure Electronic Transaction LLC, 
1997c: pg 11) 
* SA3: Programming methods and the cryptographic system, and in particular, the random 
number generators, are of the highest quality. (Ibid: pg 16) 
SA4: The merchant's system stores account information in an encrypted form, and if 
possible off-line or behind a firewall. (Secure Electronic Transaction LLC, 1997b: pg 39) 
4.2.3 The Initial Problem Diagram 
There is only one requirement in this worked example and therefore only one problem 
diagram. The context does not include the shopping process, but instead focuses on the point 
where a purchase is completed. Figure 4-2 shows a first-cut problem diagram, built by 
considering the SET processing flows. 
Recall from the discussion at the beginning of this section that there are two security 
requirements to be satisfied: SRI: only authorized individuals may use the cardholder 
credentials, and SR2: only authorized users may see cardholder account information (CAV' 
CAI is made visible by the CAI phenomena in the problem diagram, and the asset cardholder 
credentials is stored in the machine. Our goal is to generate an informal argument that these 
security requirements are satisfied. 
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By tracing the CAI through the problem diagram, one sees that it must reside in unknown 
form within the Machine domain. According to the SET specification, the CAI must be 
encrypted between the machine and the merchant. There is nothing in the problem description 
(problem diagram) that indicates that only the user or the merchant can see the CAI. One can 
say the same thing about cardholder credentials. We can say nothing about whether SRI or SR2 
are satisfied. We use these observations, the requirements SRI and SR2, and the security 
assumptions SAI-SA4 to make the following trust assumptions5: 
TAM - satisfaction of SRI: As the credentials are stored on the machine, and as there is 
no apparent way to limit who can access these credentials, SAI forces us to assume that 
the domain Users in the problem contains only individuals authorized to use the 
credentials. 
" TAI-2 - satisfaction of SRI: The CAI and credentials are not visible outside the machine. 
(SA2) 
" TAI-3 - satisfaction of SRI: The generated symmetric encryption keys are crypto- 
graphically secure. (SA3) 
" TAl-4 - satisfaction of SRI and SR2: The merchant cannot know the cardholder's private 
key, and therefore cannot see the CAI as it passes through to the payment gateway. 
The first trust assumption TAM, that the domain Users contains only authorized individuals, 
is clearly risky, making the argument that SRI is satisfied very problematic. There is no 
information available in the context to justify the claim. The analyst should change the problem 
to eliminate the trust assumption and reduce the risk. A similar statement must be made about 
TA1-2, because nothing can be found in the context that allows the engineer to claim that the 
storage is secure. If the information can be read without supplying some credentials that arc not 
stored on the machine, then the existence of viruses, spyware, and other programs/uscrs make 
the trust assumption's claim ludicrous. Vulnerabilities permitting realization of the threats still 
5 The labeling TA I -n instead of TAn is used because we will make a second set of trust assumptions TA2-n later. 
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exist, and appropriate domains and phenomena must be added to close the vulnerabilities and 
satisfy the requirement. 
Verifying TAI-3 is probably not necessary, assuming that the cryptographic software comes 
from a company that the requirements engineer believes has verified its applications. if the 
engineer is uncomfortable with this belief, then a domain representing the encryption software 
company must be added to the problem, and then analyzed appropriately. 
TAI-4 serves to limit the scope of the analysis, stating that nothing on the other side of the 
merchant can expose CAI to the merchant. Unfortunately, the SET processing flows diagram 
(Figure 4-1, step 7) shows that the payment gateway can give the CAI back to the merchant. 
The trust assumption is invalid and must be removed. 
Because TAI-I was rejected, a passphrase has been added to verify that the user is 
authorized. The passphrase is used to encrypt the CAI and certificate storage. Use of the 
passphrase and encryption protects the CAI against both viruses and other users of the machine. 
Spywarc that can capture the entry of the passphrase is still a problem, one that is not further 
discussed in this thesis. Because the rejection of TAI-I & TAl-4 caused the system to be 
modified, we do not look further at TAI-2. 
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Figure 4-3 - Purchase problem (second try) 
Figure 4-3 presents the modified problem. The context has been expanded to include the 
payment gateway. 
Thinking about the satisfaction argument using the new problem diagram exposes the nccd 
for the following trust assumptions: 
* TA2-I - satisfaction of SRI and SR2: Users will not expose the passphrasc, ensuring that 
only authorized individuals use the credentials (SRI) and that authorized individuals may 
see the CAI (SR2) 
e TA2-2 - satisfaction of SR2: The merchant implements the SET recommendations and 
securely stores the CAI. There is no practical way to bypass this security, regardless of 
storage medium (operational, backup, etc. ) 
e TA2-3 - satisfaction of SR2: The merchant's employees authorized to see the CAI will not 
reveal it. 
e TA2-4 - satisfaction of SR2: The CAI never appears in the c1car on the merchant's internal 
LAN - Local Area Network. 
o The same trust assumptions that apply to the merchant also apply to the payment gateway. 
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Figure 44 presents the solution along with the four trust assumptions. To reduce the 
complexity of the diagram, we do not show the phenomena or the trust assumptions applied to 
the payment gateway. T'he trust assumptions arc represented diagrammatically by an arc from 
the dependent domain to an oval containing a short summary of the depcndcd-upon properties. 
Ile risk presented by TA2-1, that the passphrasc will not remain confidential, may or may 
not be acceptable. Personal experience indicates that it was not acceptable to at least one bank. 
When BNP (Banque Nationale de Paris) announced its SET implementation, the bank sent a 
smartcard rcadcr to each customer who agreed to use SET. The user was required to know the 
passphrase, to insert the appropriate smartcard into the reader, and to know the PIN for the card. 
Lcaming the passphrasc was not sufficient. One needed a second phrase (the PIN) and physical 
possession of the card. 
The rcmaining trust assumptions arc problcmatic. Thcrc is no practical way for a 
requirements engineer to examine every merchant and payment gateway company, so the 
assumptions must be accepted at face value. 
The trust assumptions required to fulfill the security requirement might provoke a debate 
about whether a customcr-side product based SET is worth constructing. Given that the CAI can 
be stored on the merchant's machine, the difference between a SET solution and the ubiquitous 
solution based on SSL (secure sockets layer) is not large. Using SET, it is more difficult for a 
merchant to change an order, but a dishonest merchant would have no problem creating new 
non-SET orders charged to the customer. Dishonest merchants and employees could sell the 
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account information. Hackers could steal it. The requirements engineer can do nothing to 
mitigate the problems exposed by these trust assumptions. The stakeholders must decide 
whether the risks are acceptable. It is interesting to note that SET has been largely abandoned. 
4.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced one of our contributions: trust assumptions. We have provided an 
approach for using trust assumptions when reasoning about the satisfaction of security 
requirements. The approach uses the strong distinction between system requirements and 
machine specifications found in problem frames, permitting the requirements engineer to choose 
how to conform to the requirements. The trust assumptions embedded in the solution inform 
requirements engineers, better enabling them to choose between alternate ways of satisfying the 
functional requirements while ensuring that vulnerabilities are removed or not created. Finally, 
trust assumptions provide a foundation for making informal satisfaction arguments about the 
security of a proposed system. 
The informal arguments presented in this chapter suffer from three flaws. The arguments 
have a very infonnal structure, and are not amenable to analysis. Justification of trust 
assumptions can introduce other trust assumptions, and this is not accounted for. Finally, there 
is no systematic exploration of the linkages between the argument and the trust assumptions. 
Our proposed security requirements framework, described in the next two chapters, addresses 
these problems by: 
" better defiming security requirements and relating them to security goals. 
" placing security requirements in a framework that explicitly pcnnits iteration and 
requirements replacement. 
adding a formal security satisfaction argument that incorporates trust assumptions into the 
premises. 
adding a recursive informal satisfaction argument that permits one to argue the validity of 
trust assumptions, perhaps by (recursively) creating other trust assumptions. 
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The literature review in Chapter 3 and the discussion of trust assumptions in Chapter 4 
exposed several security requirements problem areas: 
" Multiple definitions of security requirements 
" Inconsistent and difficult to understand satisfaction criteria for security requirements 
" No structure for verifying that a system can satisfy the security requirements 
" No explicit inclusion of the analyst's trust assumptions 
"A general lack of a clear pathway for deriving security requirements from business goals. 
We propose a security requirements framework to address these problCMS6, facilitating an 
understanding of the elicitation, validation, and verification of security requirements and othcr 
artifacts by integrating the concepts of the two disciplines of requirements engineering and 
security engineering. 
The framework takes two concepts from requirements engineering: the concept of business 
goals that are operationalized into functional requirements while applying appropriate 
constraints, and the concept of satisfaction (or adequacy) arguments. From security engineering, 
the framework concept of assets, together with threats of harm to those assets. In our 
framework: 
e Security goals and security requirements aim to protect assets from harm. 
6 The framework was first described in (Moffett & Nuseibeh, 2003) and substantially elaborated in (Moffctt, I laley ct al., 2004) 
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Primary security goals arc opcrationalizcd into primary security requirements, which take 
the form of constraints on the functional requirements sufficient to protect the assets from 
identified harms. Primary security requirements are, consequently, preventative. 
Feasibility, tradcoff, and conflict analyses (Redwine, 2006: pg 81) may lead to the addition 
of secondary security goals, which will (eventually) manifcst themselves as additional 
functional and/or secondary security requirements. Secondary security goals and 
requirements may call for detective or preventative measures, a possibility discussed 
furthcr bclow. 
e Security satisfaction arguments show that the system can respect the security requirements. 
The framework assists with understanding the place of security requirements within the 
development of an individual application, along with the relationships between the security 
requirements and other artifacts produced during development. 
5.1 Framework vs. Process 
This thesis proposes a framework within which development processes might function. One 
might think of the framework as a set of ordered milestones, indicating by when certain artifacts 
are to have been produced. The framework says that one should produce X and Y, and that one 
must produce X before one can produce Y, but it says nothing about how one produces X or Y. 
The how would be a process: a set of steps that if followed should allow one to make the 
transition from X to Y. The distinction is important because most organizations have a process 
they follow, so imposing one would be difficult. However, a process can be fitted into this 
framework if the process produces visible functional requirements, and if the user of the process 
will produce context and problem diagrams along with the other artifacts already produced by 
the process. 
One difficulty with describing a framework is that many steps or outputs are abstract or 
unspecified. To overcome this difficulty, in this thesis we instantiate the framework using a 
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combination of Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering (van Lamsweerde, 2001) and Problem 
Frames (Jackson, 2001), describing it in terms of a set of activities. 
5.2 Definition of Security Goals 
Security goals are derived from the business goals of the system (Allen, 2001). Some number 
of actors, operations, and objects will be required to satisfy the business goals. To paraphrase 
somewhat the introduction to this thesis, security goals arise when stakeholders establish that 
they wish to avoid harm to some objects in the context of the system, be they tangible (e. g., 
cash) or intangible (e. g., information), that have direct or indirect value. Objects valued in either 
way are called assets, and the stakeholders naturally wish to protect themselves from any harm 
that might come from abusing these assets. 
Harm may not be to the asset itself (direct harm), but instead may be a consequence of some 
misuse or abuse of the asset (indirect harm). Examples of indirect harm include damage to 
reputation caused by exposure of flawed hiring policies, loss of contracts caused by exposure of 
pricing or costing information, or loss of trade secrets through the theft of some newly designed 
widget. In other words, one is not necessarily protecting assets from harm, but is instead 
protecting against harm caused by abuse of assets. Consider the case where the asset is 
confidential information, such as the design for an unreleased product. Abusing the information 
by making it public does not harm the information, but future revenue of the company could be 
adversely affected. Now consider the case of the destruction of a building. One harm is direct: 
the cost of replacing the building. However, other harms are possible, such as (again) the loss of 
future revenue caused by the inability to do business. In this case, there arc multiple harms, cach 
with diverse risk and impact, which might require different protections. 
One set of security goals describe conditions that must be avoided in order to kccp the level 
of harm to an acceptable level. For example, tangible assets might be destroyed, stolen, or 
modified; the harm is the loss of the asset itself (direct harm). Information assets might be 
destroyed, revealed, or modified; the harm could be the loss of the asset (direct harm) or the 
consequences of exposing the asset (indirect harm). 
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The security community has enumerated some general security concerns, labeling them with 
the letters C, 1, A, and more recently a second A ((Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2002) and other security 
textbooks): 
* Confidentiality: ensure that an asset is visible only to actors authorized to see it. 
Confidentiality is larger than 'prevent read access to a file'. For example, it includes 
controlling visibility of a data stream on a network, and of papers on someone's desk. 
Integrity: ensure that the asset is not corrupted. Integrity is larger than 'prevent write 
access to a file', for example including ensuring that transactions that should not occur 
indeed do not, that the contents of backup media are not changed, that incorrect entries in a 
paper-bascd accounting system are not made, and data streams are not modified between 
their cridpoints. 
Availability: ensure that the asset is readily accessible to agents that need it, when they 
need it. A counterexample is preventing a company from doing business by denying it 
access to something important, such as access to its computer systems or its offices. 
* Authentication: ensure that the identity of the asset or actor is known. A common example 
is the simple login. More complicated examples include mutual authentication (e. g., 
exchange of cryptography keys), and intellectual property rights management. 
By connecting these general concerns to the assets implicated in a system, and then 
postulating actions that would violate these concerns (that would be an abuse of the asset), one 
can construct extended descriptions of possible threats to assets. These threat descriptions 
(I falcy, Lancy ct al., 2004c) are phrases of the form performing action X onltolwith asset Y 
could cause harm Z. Threat descriptions permit a form of asset-centered threat modeling, and 
arc represented by a thrcc-clcmcnt tuplc: the asset, the action that will exploit the asset, and the 
subsequent harm. Threat descriptions are generated by enumerating the assets involved in the 
system, then for each asset, listing the actions that exploit the asset to cause direct or indirect 
harm. The action is derived from the security concern; it does not name a specific vulnerability 
or attack path. For example, one can imagine erasing (an action related to the integrity concern) 
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the customer records (the asset) of a company to cause loss of revenue (the harm). A set of 
security goals is found by negating the threat descriptions, which in goal-oriented requirements 
engineering terms makes them into prevent (or avoid) goals. 
Another set of security goals can be found by combining management control principles and 
application business goals. Management control principles include common security principles 
such as least privilege and separation of duties (NIST, 1995: pg 109). Application business 
goals will determine the applicability of management control principles to the system, for 
example by defining those privileges that are needed for the application, and excluding those 
that are not. An organization may already have done the analysis and published policies that 
apply to assets in a system. The security goal is a statement that the policies and/or principles be 
applied where appropriate in the system. 
Note that legitimate stakeholders may have conflicting security goals. Tbc set of relevant 
security goals may be mutually inconsistent, and inconsistencies will need to be resolved during 
the goal analysis process before a set of consistent requirements can be obtained. 
Looking at the goals of attackers could be useful when determining security goals for the 
system, for example when enumerating assets or quantifying harm, but we do not consider them 
a part, even negated, of the set of security goals. The goals of the system owner and other 
legitimate stakeholders are not directly related to the goals of attackers, because security is not a 
zero sum game like football. In football, the goals won by an attacker are exactly the goals lost 
by the defender. Security is different; there is no exact equivalence between the losses incurred 
by the asset owner and the gains of the attacker. To see this, look at two examples: 
e Robert Morris unleashed the Internet Worm, causing millions of dollars of damagc, 
apparently as an experiment without serious malicious intent (Spafford, 1989). The 
positive value to the attacker was much less than the loss incurred by the attacked sitcs. 
Many virus writers today arc prepared to expend huge effort in writing a still morc 
ingenious virus, which may cause little damage (screen message "You've got a Virus"). 
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Generally, there is no simple relationship between the gains of a virus writer and the losses 
incuffcd by thosc who arc attackcd. 
The consequences of security not being a zero sum game arc twofold: The first is that the 
evaluation of possible harm to an asset can generally be carried out without reference to 
particular attackers; one needs only to determine that harm can be incurred. The second is that 
the goals of attackers cannot be solely used to arrive at the security goals of a defender to 
prevent harm; further consideration is necessary to determine whether and what harm is 
incurred if the attacker satisfics his or her goals. 
5.3 Definition of Security Requirements 
We define security requirements as constraints on the functions of the system, where these 
constraints operationalim onc or morc sccurity goals. 
Sccurity rcquircmcnts opcrationalizc the sccurity goals as follows: 
9 Thcy arc constraints on the systcm's functional rcquircmcnts, rathcr than thcmsclvcs bcing 
functional rcquircmcnts. 
They express the system's security goals in operational terms, precise enough to be given 
to a designcr/architcct. Security requirements, like functional requirements, arc 
prescriptive, providing a specylication (behavior in terms of phenomena - see Chapter 2 
Section 2.1) to achieve the desired cffcct. 
Ile fact that security requirements are constraints on functional requirements rather than 
separate functional requirements is important for validation of the functional requirements. 
Validating a set of functional requirements in the face of constraints is easier than validating 
requirements consisting of the original functional requirements and the additional functional 
requirements addcd for security. In the first case, one need check only that after the functions 
arc constrained, they still do what they originally wcre intended to do. In the second case, the 
system designer dccidcs how the requirements intcract and how the interactions arc realized. 
Only aftcr design is complete can one check to see if functionality has changed beyond 
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acceptability. Adding constraints to particular functional requirements (ones where the assets in 
question are implicated) keeps interaction analysis a part of requirements engineering. 
5.4 From Security Goals to Security Requirements 
We propose an iterative hierarchy of security goals and security requirements. The first 
iteration produces primary goals and requirements that are derived from the business goals and 
functional requirements. These goals and requirements are primary in the sense that if the 
resulting system respects the primary security requirements, then the system will satisfy the 
primary security goals. 
Further iterations produce secondary security goals and requirements. They are added for one 
or both of the following reasons: 1) to enable construction of an acceptable satisfaction 
argument for the satisfaction of primary security requirements, or 2) to permit an acceptable 
feasible realization of the primary security requirements. Satisfaction arguments are discusscd 
later in this chapter and more fully in Chapter 6. 
The termfeasible realization takes into consideration technical feasibility, cost/bcncfit plus 
risk, and stakeholder tradeoffs (Redwine, 2006). It may be that there is no practical way to 
respect a constraint and thereby prevent the harm; destroying a computer room with an atomic 
explosion comes to mind. Perhaps stakeholders do not agree on the goals or requirements. Risk 
analysis may indicate that the cost of respecting a security requirement is excessive, in which 
case the analyst may decide to detect violation after the fact, and then both recover from and 
repair the breach. Availability requirements are a good example - many such requirements do 
not prevent loss of availability, but instead imply a recovery capability. For example, secondary 
security goals would be added to the system to require that backups be taken and to managc 
these backups. Analysis of the secondary security goals may lead to the addition of sccondary 
security requirements. This is, of course, a recursive process. 
Secondary security goals and security requirements are not secondary in terms of importancc, 
but are instead secondary because they exist to enable satisfaction, to an acceptable level, of the 
primary and hierarchically superior secondary security requirements. 
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Secondary security goals can provoke the modification of existing functional requirements2 
or the addition of new functional requirements. This will occur when satisfaction of the 
secondary security goal requires addition of new management capabilities (e. g., management of 
authentication mechanisms), alteration of system-level workflows, or addition of new assets that 
the system must accommodate in some way. 
It is very important to note that secondary security goals and requirements supersede the 
primary security requirements, and can change the context and behavior of the system. For 
example, choosing to use attack detection instead of prevention implies that the primary security 
requirement will not be completely satisfied, as the attack will not be prevented. The choice 
means that the secondary goals and associated security requirements are considered suitably 
equivalent to the primary security requirements; they cover and replace (but do not delete) them. 
The decision to use detection instead of prevention could also change the behavior of the system 
because of the addition of domains and phenomena to facilitate detection. 
78 
5.5. Security Requirements and Context 
Door Mechanism 
Fc 
Control Open box when 
button pushed 
>, 
Person+Button . 1" 
a: CM! MotorOpen b: PB! BuffonDown 
CM! MotorClose PB! BuftonUp 
CM! DoorlsOpen 
CM! Door[sClosed 
Figure 5-1 - Example Problem Diagram 
5.5 Security Requirements and Context 
We reiterate that security requirements are applied in the system context, which is larger than 
the software. A security requirement can affect many parts of the system, some completely 
outside the software to be constructed. A variant of Jackson's problem framc diagrams 
(Jackson, 2001) is used to represent the system context. To refresh the reader's memory, the 
sample problem diagram from Chapter 2, Section 2.1 is reproduced here as Figure 5-1. The 
boxes are domains. Lines connecting the boxes represent interfaces, which arc labeled with 
lower-case letters. The phenomena on the interfaces are listed as a set with the appropriate label. 
The domain controlling a given phenomenon is indicated using a letter or Icttcrs in front of an 
exclamation mark ('! '). 
We chose problem frames to represent the context because problem framcs pcrrnit us to 
incorporate behavior specification of real-world domains at a level of formality ranging from 
none to very. The behavior specification is necessary for constructing the satisfaction argumcnts 
we propose. We are not claiming that use of problem frames is necessary. We arc not, however, 
aware of a better substitute. 
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5.6 Development Artifacts and Dependencies 
All system dcvc1opnicrit processes havc recognizable stages that produce artifacts. 
5-6-1 Core Arlýfiicts 
Core arlifacts are successivcly closer representations of a working systern. They are ordered 
in the abstraction hierarchy shown in Figure 5-2, progressing from the most abstract to the final 
concrete xorking system. At early stages, core artifacts are typically documents or prototypes. 
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The fmal core artifact is the working system itself, consisting of a combination of physical and 
software items. 
Two sets of core artifacts are of most interest to this thesis. On the mainstream requirements 
engineering side, one finds descriptions of goals, requirements, and the system (in the large) 
context & architecture. On the security engineering side, one finds assets and control principles. 
5.62 Support Artifacts 
Support artifacts are artifacts that help to develop, analyze, or justify the design of a core 
artifact. They may include formal analysis, informal argument, calculation, example or counter. 
example, etc. They are by-products of processes, whose aim is to help produce verified and 
valid core artifacts. 
5.6.3 Dependencies between Artifacts 
There are dependencies in the artifact hierarchy. For example, an opcrationalized rcquircmcnt 
is dependent upon a higher-level goal from which it has been derived, because alteration of the 
goal may cause alteration of the requirement. We call this kind of dependency hierarchical 
dependency. 
There is also a reverse kind of dependency: feasibility. If it proves impossible to implement a 
system that sufficiently satisfies a requirements specification, then this will force a change in the 
goals or requirements. The higher-level artifact is dependent on the feasibility of the artifacts 
below it in the hierarchy. 
These dependency relationships have an important implication for the structure of 
development processes. If an artifact is dependent upon the implementation of another artifact 
for its feasibility, then if the implementation is not feasible, there must be an iteration path in the 
process back to the ancestor from its descendant. 
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5.7 Framework Overview 
Figure 5-3 shows an ordered set of' activitics for moving from business goals to security 
re(Imicincrit satisl'action arguments. Boxes in the figure represent activities that produce 
artil-acts. Typically, a box in the figure has two exits, one Im success, and one for I'ailure. 
I. ailme can be one of two kinds. The first failUrc kind is that it is not 1'easible to create a 
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consistent set of the artifacts called for by that activity. The second kind is that validation of the 
artifacts against a higher level - such as validation that security requirements satisfy security 
goals - shows that they fail to meet their aims. For example, one might be unable to construct a 
set of validated ftinctional requirements from the business goals. Alternatively, one might fail to 
construct adequate security requirement satisfaction arguments. Iteration may cascade upwards 
if the problem cannot be resolved at the preceding step. 
There are four general stages in the activity diagram. Although one could describe these 
stages in terms of the artifacts produced, along with the ordering between them, it is clearer to 
describe them in terms of what is the goal of the activities in each stage. The activities arc: 
9 Stage 1: identify functional requirements 
9 Stage 2: identify/revise security goals 
o Stage 3: identify/revise security requirements 
* Stage 4: verify that the security requirements can be satisfied by the system, by 
constructing satisfaction arguments. 
Each stage is discussed in more detail below. 
5.7.1 Stage 1: Identify Functional Requirements 
The only requirement the framework places upon the development process is that the 
engineer produce problem diagrams as described in Chapter 2 Section 2.1. flow the 
requirements engineer gets to this point is open. 
5.7.2 Stage 2: IdentifylRevise Security Goals 
There are three general steps required to identify the security goals: identify candidatc asscts, 
select the management principles to apply, and then determine the security goals. The result is a 
set of security goals, which are validatcd by ensuring that the business goals remain satisfied. 
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The first iteration through this stage results in the generation of primary security goals- 
Subsequent iterations result in secondary security goals, either because of asset analysis or 
because they were passed up from a temporally previous step, which are traceable, perhaps 
through multiple levels and through security requirements, to the original, primary, security 
goal(s). 
5.7.2.1 Identify Candidate Assets 
The goal of this step is to find all the objects in the system context that might have value, 
direct or indirect. In general, assets consist of all the information objects stored in or accessed 
by the system and any tangible objects such as the computers themselves. An object has direct 
value when the potential harm described in a threat is to the object itself. An object has indirect 
value if realizing a threat involving that asset causes harm somewhere else, such as to revenue, 
to costs, or to reputation. An object can have both direct and indirect value; when money is 
taken from a bank, the bank both loses the money and has its reputation harmed. 
One potential asset might contain, or enclose, other potential assets. A good example is a 
database that contains individual information assets. Another example is backup media, which 
can contain any number of information assets. 
5.7.2.2 Select Management Principles 
The functions that the system is to provide must be compared to the management principles 
that the organization wishes to apply. These principles might include (not intended to be an 
cxhaustivc list): 
* scparation of duties (NIST, 1995: pg 109) - dividing roles and responsibilities to ensure 
that no one person has sufficient privilege to both start and complete important 
transactions. 
least privilege (lbid) - ensuring that a person has only what is required to do his or her job, 
in both privilege to know and privilege to do. 
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audit trails (ISO/IEC, 1999b: pg 181; NIST, 1995: pg 213) - recording information about 
events of potential security interest, such as who did what, when. 
Chinese wall (Brewer & Nash, 1989) -not permitting operations if a potential conflict of 
interest exists, such as an analyst giving advice to both company A and competitors of 
company A. 
The sector the system is being designed for may have standard management principles, such 
as no outside network connections, or no removable media capabilities on any computer. In 
addition, the organization might have already done a harm/risk analysis and developed 
organization-wide security policies for asset types. Which global policies to apply within the 
system under consideration must be identified and fed into the next step. 
5.7.2.3 Detennine/Revise Security Goals 
When developing security goals, one should determine whether a hann analysis must be done 
for the assets. If the analysis has been done elsewhere (e. g., organization-wide policies) and if 
the assets are covered by the policies, then a list of security goals is generated by applying the 
management principles to the assets and business goals of the system. The result is a set of 
achieve goals with forms similar to "achieve Separation of Duties when paying invoices" or 
6'audit all uses of account information. " 
If the analysis done elsewhere is not considered sufficient, one should do a harm analysis. in 
general, harm results from the violation of one or more of the security concerns describcd in 
Section 5.2. For information assets, these concerns arc confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. The concerns are similar for tangible assets: exposure, modification, and 
deprivation (theft or destruction). These concerns are used to enumerate the threat descriptions. 
One asks questions of the form "what harm could come from violating the [insert conccm hcrc] 
of [insert asset here]? " Answers to these questions are threat descriptions, which arc rcprcscntcd 
as tuples of the form (action, asset, harml. 
Threats may have a time element, stating that the harm will occur only if the violation occurs 
before or after some point, or within some interval. For example, a company's earnings rcport is 
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conridcntial (and thcrcforc valuable) only up to the moment it is made public. The time element 
is important when looking for and countering vulnerabilities, as it gives an indication of how 
severe a given vulnerability is and what measures arc appropriate for countering the 
vulnerability. 
It is worth noting again that an object might not have any value in itself, but instead is valued 
by the harm caused indirectly to something else. For example, information about the amount of 
money paid to redecorate the company president's officc has no intrinsic value, but may be 
highly valued because exposing the f igurc could damage the reputation of the company. In other 
words, when evaluating thrcats (how assets arc associated with harms), one must look for direct 
and indirect cffects. 
5.7.3 Stage 3: IdenlifylRevise Security Requirements 
Rccal I that we dcf inc security requirements as constraints on functional requirements that arc 
needed to satisfy applicable security goals. To determine the constraints, we must determine 
which security goals apply to which functional requirements, which means we must know 
which assets arc implicated in fulfilling a particular functional requirement. We use Jackson's 
problem diagrams (Jackson, 2001) for this purpose; these diagrams describe the system context. 
Wc do not attempt to identify a particular problem class, but instead describe domains, their 
interconnect ions, shared phenomena, and requirements into a system problem diagram. 
A simple example of a functional requirement decorated with such a constraint is: 
The system shall provide Personnel information only to members of Human 
Resources Dept. 
The constraint ("only to ... ") 
is attached to the function ("provide Personnel 
information"); it makes sense only in the context of the function. One might also impose 
temporal constraints: 
The system shall provide Personnel information only during normal office 
hours 
and complex constraints on traces, for example the Chinese Wall Security Policy, (Brcwcr & 
Nash, 1989): 
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The system shall provide Personal Information only to any person who has 
not previously accessed information about a person in a different 
subsidiary. 
Availability requirements might need to express constraints on response time: 
The system shall provide Personnel Information within 1 hour for 99% of 
requests. 
Note that this availability requirement differs only in magnitude from a Response Time quality 
goal, which might use the same format to require a sub-second response time. 
Once a set of security requirements has been developed, one must validate that the security 
requirements satisfy the security goals. This would be done using satisfaction arguments 
appropriate to the level of formality used to describe the goals. Given that goals are often 
written in plain text, the arguments could have a form similar to our inner arguments (see 
Section 6.1.2). How these arguments are expressed is lcft open to the designer of the process to 
be used, and not defined within our framework. 
in the same fashion as security goals, the first iteration through this stage results in primary 
security requirements. Subsequent iterations generate secondary security requirements. 
5.7.4 Stage 4: Verify Security Requirements against System Context 
It is important to verify that the security requirements are satisfied by the system as described 
by the context. We propose the use of formal and structured informal argumentation for this 
verification step: to convince a reader that a system can satisfy the security requirements laid 
upon it. These arguments, called satisfaction arguments and discussed more completely in 
Chapter 6, are in two parts. The first part, the outer argument, consists of a formal argument to 
prove a system can satisfy its security requirements, drawing upon claims about the domains in 
a system, and assuming the claims are accepted. The second part, the inner argument, consists 
of structured informal argumcnts, supporting the claims madc in the formal argumcnt about the 
systcm's bchavior and charactcristics. Building on our undcrstanding of sccurity rcquircmcnts, 
the satisfaction argumcnts assist with idcntifying sccurity-rclcvant systcrn propcrtics, and 
dctcrmining how inconsistcnt and implausiblc assumptions about thern affcct the sccurity of a 
systcm. 
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Stage 4 begins by verifying that the ftinctional requirements, as constrained by the security 
requirements, remain satisfied by the system as described by the system context. Once the 
functional requirements are shown to be satisfied, the security requirements themselves are 
verified by construction of the two-part argument described above. If it proves impossible to 
construct valid arguments, the context is revisited. If necessary, secondary security goals are 
added to correct problems, and the context is revisited. If this turns out to be infeasible, it is 
necessary to return to the beginning, revisiting the business goals. See the next section for 
additional details. 
5.8 Iteration 
One reason that an analyst may fail to construct a convincing satisfaction argument is that 
there is not enough information available to justify the claims (trust assumptions) made. For 
example, to justify a claim that users are authenticated, there must be some phenomena 
cxchangcd between the user and the rest of the system. The choice of phenomena and behavior 
is a design decision that may have a significant impact on the system architecture and context. 
For cxample, it is possible that architectural choices are imposed that extend the context to 
include all of IT management. For these reasons, the framework assumes that the process 
includes Twin Peaks rcquirements/design iterations (see Chapter 2 Section 2.3), asking the 
designers to add more detail into the system context so that claims can be justified. These 
iterations move from stage four to stage one, and from there back through the activities. 
The details added during a requiremcnts/design iteration may require new functions to be 
added to the system, thus generating new functional requirements. Continuing the authentication 
example from above, assume the designers choose a rctinal-scanning authentication technique. 
The dcsigncrs add domains and phenomena to the context to describe how authentication takes 
place from the point of view of the user (in problem space). However, one cannot necessarily 
stop at the addition of phenomena. The authentication system must be managed. New assets 
have been added to the system, for example the retina description information. New domains 
have been added: for example the administrators and the rctinal scanners. New goals have been 
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added to the system: assure that the functional additions serve their purpose. These additions 
could easily have an impact on system security, precipitating the addition of new security goals, 
or changing existing ones. 
When the requirements engineer or designer alters the context, they (might) add secondary 
security goals to the system to ensure that the preconditions or consequences of the alterations 
become part of the requirements for the system. A new requirements and asset analysis must be 
performed. Continuing the authentication example, a goal similar to manage authentication 
database would be added in stage 4. The process would then restart in stage I with a reanalysis 
of the context and functional requirements, to understand the consequences of the new goal. 
New assets (e. g., the authentication data) would be found in stage 2, and then new security goals 
to protect the assets and new security requirements to constrain functional operations wherever 
the new asset appears would be added. 
Another possibility is that the requirements/design iteration will establish that there is no 
feasible way to satisfy the security requirement(s). In this case, the designers and the 
stakeholders must come to an agreement on some acceptable alternative, such as a weaker 
constraint, attack detection, and/or attack recovery. They would add appropriate secondary 
security goals to the system, probably resulting in new secondary security requirements. The 
resulting secondary security goals and requirements cover the ones that were not fcasibic. As 
the new secondary goals and requirements are considered suitably equivalent to the originals, 
satisfying the new ones is considered to satisfy the originals. 
Clearly the 'secondariness' of any goals added must be remembered. If the hierarchically 
superior ('more primary') security requirement is changed, then the secondary security goals 
may need changing. For example, if authentication became unnecessary, then the manage 
authentication database goal should be removed, with the consequential removal of derived 
functional requirements and assets. 
Finally, it is possible that no feasible way to satisfy a security requirement exists, and no 
agreement can be reached on alternatives. In this case, one must return to the original business 
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and quality goals of the application, modifying the initial conditions to change the assets 
implicated in or the security goals of the system. Alternatively, one might decide not to build the 
System 
5.9 Worked Example 
Wc use an cxample ofa Personnel Information display system to illustrate the framework. 
The example begins in this chapter, working through stages I through 3, and then continues 
with stage 4 in Chaptcr 6. We begin by stating the business goals for a simple system. Next, we 
present the functional requirements, and then derive the system security requirements by 
applying the organ izat ion's security goals to the Functional requirerricrits. 
Where appropriate, we onlit from the discussion processes that arc not part ol'thc frartmvork. 
5, 
.-). / Stage /. - hlenfýli, Functional Requirements 
We begin this cxarnple assuming that the work in this stage has already been carried out. The 
assuniption is that the business goals have been elicited and that there is only one goal: 
BG1: Provision of people's personnel information to them. 
We further assunic that the stakeholders agree that there is one functional rcquirerricrit: 
FR1: on request from a Person (instance of People), the system shall 
provide HR data (perSData) for a specified payroll number (persNumber) to 
that Person. 
Users 
personal 
information 
Machine + 
HR Data 
a UlpersNumber 
MlpersData 
BI\ 
Provide HR data 
requested by user 
Figure 5-4 - Initial IIR problent diagram 
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Figure 54 shows the problem diagram for the requirement and context. There arc two 
phenomena of interest. The first, u! pe rSNumbe r, is the user's request for personnel information. 
The second, m! pe rSData, is the information returned by the request. 
5.9.2 Stage 2: IdentifylRevise Security Goals 
Discussion with the stakeholders shows that, ignoring physical assets such as the computers 
and the buildings, there is only one asset implicated in the system: perSData, an information 
asset. 
We now list the threat descriptions (acrion on asser to cause harm). Actions that might 
cause harm that can be done to perSData are exposure (loss of confidentiality), alteration (loss 
of integrity), and denial of service (loss of availability), resulting in various harms. Some 
possible threat descriptions are: 
Confidentiality threat descriptions: 
funauthorized exposure, persData, expense of privacy violation lawsuit)) 
(unauthorized exposure, perSData, expense of discontented employee) 
Integrity threat descriptions: 
{unauthorized alteration, perSData, expense of salary underpay lawsuit) 
funauthorized alteration, perSData, expense of excess salary) 
funauthorized alteration, perSData, expense of information restore) 
Availability threat descriptions: 
{-available, perSData, expense of late salary payments) 
f-available, perSData, expense of discontented employees) 
f-available, perSData, expense of unfiled government-mandated reports) 
The system owner considers all of these threat descriptions to represent significant risk, and 
therefore wishes to avoid them. 
The confidentiality threat descriptions give rise to the security goal 
SG1: prevent unauthorized exposure of PerSData 
Likewise, the next integrity threat descriptions give rise to the goal 
SG2: prevent unauthorized alteration of PerSData, 
The availability threat descriptions give rise to 
SG3: prevent denial of access to PerSData by authorized persons. 
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5.9.3 Stage 3: IdentifylRevise Security Requirements 
The next step is to derive security requirements from the combination of business goals and 
security goals. Recall that security requirements constrain the function called for by a functional 
requirement that opcrationalizcs a business goal. Investigating the word authorized in SG1, the 
requirements engineer determines that an individual is permitted to see only his or her own data. 
Furthermore, assume that the data for a person contains certain statistical information such as 
the difference of that person's salary from the mean salary of the department. It is possible that 
this information will expose other employees' salary because of lack of sufficient statistical 
aggregation (e. g. a small department), and therefore the system must not display this 
information to the employees. This complexity leads the stakeholders to agree that personnel 
information is to be interpreted by a trained IIR staff member, and not be exposed directly to the 
employee. From these choices and by applying SG1 to FR1, one derives the security requirement 
(constraint) SR1: [FR13 only to HR staff. An informal argument that this requirement 
satisfies the security goal is: confidentiality of personnel data implies that people in general 
cannot be allowed access to this information, but IIR staff can be relied upon to maintain its 
confidentiality. Therefore, a constraint that permits IIR staff, but nobody else, to access it will 
satisfy the security goal. 
SG2 is less obvious. There is no functional requirement that permits modification of 
PerSData, so one might assume that there is no functional requirement for SG2 to constrain. 
However, FR1 does display information, and clearly one wishes that the information displayed 
be an exact analog of the stored information. From this wish, one can formulate the security 
requirement SR2: [FR11 only if the displayed information is a correct 
representation of stored information. 
Applying SG3 tO FR1, the (somcwhat arbitrary) sccurity rcquircmcnt SR3 is derivcd: SR3: 
[FRll within 60 minutes of its request. 
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Users 
personal 
information 
Machine + 
HR Data 
x UlpersNurnber 
WpersData 
Provide HR data to user 
- Only to HR staff (SR1) 
- Correct display (SR2) 
- avail in 60 mins (SR3) 
Figure 5-5 - Problem with security requirements added 
Figure 5-5 shows the problem diagram, modified to show the constraints. 
At this point, one should validate that the original business goals arc still adequatcIv 
in the face of the security requirements. It is possible that a SCCUrity requirement is so 
constraining that the system no longer incets its business goals. For example, SRI could ha% C 
been the constraint [FRI] only to the chief Information officer. This constraint is 
arguably so severe that the systern Would not meet its business goals. 
5.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the second ol'our contributions, our security requircnicnts rrajjjcý% ork. 
The framework incorporates a practical definition of' security requirements that ljj,,,, c c1car 
yes/no satisfaction criteria. It also makes the role of systern context explicit. 
The next chapter completes our explanation of our framework, locusing on Stage 4 
vcrification that security requirements can be satisficd by the system. We descrilic ()tll- thl, -(I 
contribution, security satisfaction arguments, then complete the remainder ol'our cxample. 
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As was said in Chapter 5, it is important to verify that the security requirements are satisfied 
by the system as described by the context. We use satisfaction arguments for this purpose. 
Chapter 4 introduced informal satisfaction arguments based around trust assumptions. This 
chapter extends those ideas, proposing the use of formal and structured informal argumentation 
for this verification step: to convince a reader that a system can satisfy the security requirements 
laid upon it. These satisfaction arguments are in two parts. The first part, the outer argument, 
consists of a formal argument to prove a system can satisfy its security requirements, drawing 
upon claims about a system, and assuming the claims are accepted. The second part, the inner 
argument, consists of structured informal arguments to support the claims made in the first 
argument about system behavior and characteristics. Building on our understanding of security 
requirements, the two-step satisfaction arguments assist with determining security-relevant 
system properties, and how inconsistent and implausible assumptions about them affect the 
security of a system. 
6.1 Trust Assumptions & Arguments 
A security satisfaction argument must satisfy two goals: 1) given a collection of domain 
properties and trust assumptions, to show that a system can be secure, and 2) have a uniform 
structure for the satisfaction argument so that the effects of trust assumptions arc made more 
explicit. We satisfy these goals by splitting the satisfaction argument into two parts: aformal 
outer argument that is first constructed, and informal structured inner arguments that arc 
constructed next to support the outer argument. If acceptable inner arguments to support the 
outer argument cannot be constructed, then one must reject the outer argument. 
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Chapter 4 presented trust assumptions, which are claims about the behavior or the type of 
domains included in the system, where the claims are made in order to satisfy a security 
requirement. These claims represent an analyst's trust that domains behave as described. Trust 
assumptions are in the end the analyst's opinion, and therefore assumed to be true. At some 
point, the inner arguments must stop, depending on these unsupported assumptions. We are now 
able to define what trust assumptions are in our framework: unsupported statements about the 
behavior of the system, made in order to create a convincing inner argument. 
6.1.1 The Outer Argument 
The formal outer argument uses claims about the behavior of the system (interplay of 
phenomena) to demonstrate that a security requirement (a constraint) is satisfied. The formal 
argument is expressed using some logic chosen by the requirements engineer, where the 
prcmiscs are formed from claims about domain properties and behavior, and the conclusion is 
the satisfaction of the security requirement. For simplicity, we use propositional logic in this 
chapter, resulting in the outer argument being a proof of the form: 
(domain behavior premises) [- (security requirement(s)) 
6.1.2 The Inner Arguments 
Inner arguments are informal arguments made to support the claims used in the outer 
argument. This thesis proposes a form inspired by the work of Toulmin (1958), one of the 
earliest advocates and developers of a structure for informal human reasoning and 
argumentation. We chose Toulmin-style arguments for what might be considered an engineering 
reason: they are well suited for our purpose because other than requiring that an argument have 
a conclusion, they impose restrictions on neither what can be argued nor the logical system to 
which the argument must conform. Toulmin arguments facilitate the capture of- 
" relationships between domain properties - the premises in the formal argument. 
" the trust assumptions that either are, or eventually support, these premises. 
" reasons why the argument may not be valid. 
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Toulinin et al. (Toulmin, Rieke, & Janik, 1979) describe argurnents as consisting of': 
I. Claims, the end point of'the argument - what one wishes to convince tile world of'. 
2. Grounds, providing any underlying support for the argument, such as evidence, facts, 
cot-ninon knowledge, etc. 
3. Warrants, connecting and establishing relevancy between the grounds and the clauns. A 
warrant explains how the grounds are related to the claim, not the validity ol'the grounds 
themselves. 
4. Backing, establishing that the warrants are thernselves trustworthy. These are, in el'Ica 
grounds for believing the warrants. 
5. Modal qualýfiei-s, establishing within the context of the argument the reliability or strength 
of the connections between warrants, grounds, and clairns. Modal qualifier-, permit tile 
introduction of rebutting circumstances. 
6. Rebuttals, describing what might invalidate any of the grounds, warrants, or backing, thus 
invalidating the support for the claim. 
Toulmin proposed a diagrarn for arguments that indicates how the parts fit together (Toulinin, 
1958), shown in Figure 6-1. The lines in the figure show 'movement' ol'the aq4LIIIIent f'roln ICIt 
(grounds) to right (claims). Intersections show where parts of' file argument support or (Ictract 
frorn the main line. Warrants support using grounds to justi fy it clairn, but rebuttals %% caken the 
argument. 
Backing 
Warrants 
Grounds llllmpý 
Modal 
, 111110- Chim Qualifier 
Rebuttal 
Figure 6-1 - Generic Toulmin-form argument 
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The items in an argument are summarized by Toulmin et al. (1979) as follows: "The claims 
involved in real-life arguments are, accordingly, wellfounded only if sufficient grounds of an 
appropriate and relevant kind can be offered in their support. These grounds must be connected 
to the claims by reliable, applicable, warrants, which are capable in turn of being justified by 
appeal to sufficient backing of the relevant kind. And the entire structure of argument put 
together out of these elements must be capable of being recognized as having this or that kind 
and degree of certainty or probability as being dependent for its reliability on the absence of 
certain particular extraordinary, exceptional, or otherwise rebutting circumstances. " 
Newman & Marshall (1991) show that the Toulmin form suffers because the fundamental 
recursive nature of the argument is obscured. One may need to argue the grounds, thereby 
making them claims; we found this in Chapter 4 when looking at trust assumptions. One may 
need to argue the warrants; this is the reason for the existence of the backing, but it is not clear 
how the backing differs from grounds in a normal argument. Newman and Marshall propose 
several extensions of Toulmin arguments, such as "argument chains" (claims become grounds), 
"argument hierarchies" (claims become warrants), "confluence arguments" (the 'and'ing of 
multiple arguments), and "connections by rebuttal" (rebuttals in sub-arguments). 
Although these different extensions serve different purposes in an argument, we claim that a 
single structure can accommodate all of them. To that end, we propose a unifying scheme that 
makes the recursive properties of arguments and the relationships between grounds, warrants, 
and claims explicit, while keeping the basic connections between the components that Toulmin 
proposed. In our scheme, each of the components of a Toulmin-form argument is either a 
proposition (unargued) or a sub-argumcnt (argued). We also include logical connectives in order 
to accommodate "confluence arguments". 
This scheme is realized using a simple language to represent the structure of the extended 
Toulmin arguments. The language captures the essence of Toulmin arguments while 
generalizing recursion and sub-arguments. A textual language was chosen because a) textual 
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argument optional-assignments claim '. ' 
argument optional-assignments claim 
optional-assignments LET assignments // empty ; 
assignments assignment 
assignments assignment 
assignment IDENTIFIER atom ; 
claim optional-grounds proposition optional-rebuttals; 
optional-rebuttals REBUTTED BY rebuttals_list // empty 
rebuttals-list rebuttal 
rebuttals-list ', ' rebuttal 
rebuttal proposition 
proposition MITIGATED BY proposition 
proposition MITIGATED BY '(* claim ')' ; 
optional-grounds GIVEN GROUNDS grounds-expr optional-warrant THUS CLAIM // empty ; 
optional-warrant WARRANTED By grounds-expr // empty 
grounds-expr grounds-factor 
grounds-expr AND grounds-factor 
grounds-factor grounds-term 
grounds-factor OR grounds-term 
grounds-term grounds 
NOT grounds 
grounds proposition claim 
proposition IDENTIFIER atom 
IDENTIFIER 
atom 
atom STRING 
Figure 6-2 - Language Grammar 
utteranceS7 are easier to manipulate automatically than tree diagrams, b) argument graphs arc 
easily generated from the parser's abstract syntax tree, and c) a 'compiler' can assist in dynamic 
browsing of arguments. The syntax of the language is formally defined by the LR(I) grammar 
(Aho, Sethi, & Ullman, 1986) shown in Figure 6-2. We will show how the language is used in 
the worked example. 
Our extensions have the side effect of making the role of trust assumptions within the 
argument explicit. Recall that in our argument language, a component of an argument is cither a 
I Utterance: a stream of symbols that, when processed by a lexical analyzer, becomes a stream of lexemes; that is processed by a 
parser to determine if the utterance is valid, as determined by the syntactic (and possibly semantic) rules of the language. 
99 
Chapter 6 Security Requirement Satisfaction Arguments 
proposition or a sub-argument. In other words, some components are leaf nodes (propositions), 
and others are interior nodes. Leaf nodes are trust assumptions. 
Applying the notion of leaf nodes to our two-part argument structure, trust assumptions are: 
* Premises found in an outer argument that do not appear as a claim on an inner argument. 
Such premises are, in effect, unsupported claims about domain behavior, consisting of an 
inncr argumcnt that consists only of a claim. 
e Grounds, warrants, etc., that are found in an inner argument but do not appear as a claim in 
some other inner argument. 
This definition of trust assumptions fits well with both the discussion in Chapter 4 and the 
extended recursive Toulmin argumentation described in this section. 
6.2 Worked Example 
The example of a Personnel Information display system began in Chapter 5 Section 5.9 is 
continued here to illustrate the outer and inner arguments. The work in stages I through 3 was 
done in Chapter 5, providing us with primary security requirements. We construct the 
satisfaction arguments in this chapter. Given the system security requirements, there are design 
decisions to be made about where to locate the security functionality and the approach to be 
used, and we provide one example of this. 
Reviewing the information in Chapter 5, recall that there was one business goal 
BG1: Provision of people's personnel information to them. 
Initial requirements were elicited and there was only one functional requirement: 
FR1: on request from a Person (instance of People), the system shall 
display personnel information (PerSData) for a specified payroll number 
(Payroll#) to that Person. 
Three security goals were identified: 
SG1: prevent unauthorized exposure of PersData 
SG2: prevent unauthorized alteration of PersData, 
SG3: prevent denial of access to PerSData by authorized persons. 
Applying SG 1, SG2, and SG3 to FRI resulted in three security requirements: 
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Users 
, _B] 
Personal Provide HIR data Information 
------------- requested by user Machine +- Only to HIR staff HR Dat a 
aý UpersNumber 
MlpersData 
Figure 6-3 - Problem diagram for the FIR data retrieval application 
SR1: Personnel information must be provided only to HR staff. 
SR2: displayed information must be a correct representation of stored 
information. 
SR3: Personnel information must be provided to HR staff within 60 minutes 
of its request. 
Although three security requirements were derived, considering one of' thern is suff icient to 
explore our ideas. Working through the others would be needlessly repet II I% e. WC Ch OOSC SRI. 
Figure 6-3 shows the initial problem diagram for this application. There are t\k() plienonjcjjýj 
of interest. The first, u! perSNumber, is the user's request for personnel itil'ormation. The second, 
m! perSData, is the information returned by the request. 
6.2.1 Constructing Sati, yfaction A rguments 
Our goal is to construct a convincing satistaction argument that I system cýjlj ý,, jti.,, Jv its 
security requirements. The reader may note the use of* the word "can", Instead of' the ýý()rd 
"will". We use the phrase "can satisfy" because one cannot know il'thc eventual inipleniciltat joll 
will respect the specifications. Nor can one know it' the system will Introduce till I III clided 
vulnerabilities, which will manifest themselves as phenomena not described in the hchaýioral 
specification but visible in the world; buffer overflows are I prime example. 
We begin by constructing an outer argument that proves t Ile cI aini: IIR data is proNidcd on IN, 
to HR staff. 
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6.2.1.1 The Outer Argument 
Starting with the HR problem shown in Figure 6-3, we first attempt to construct a proof that 
Mlpemata occurs only when uiperSNumber is input by a member of HR staff, or more 
formally that miperSData F- (User e HR). 
There are two domains in the problem: the domain 'Users' and the 'machine' (which contains 
the data). To construct the argument, the behavior of the system is first described more formally. 
We chose a notation based on the causal logic described in (Moffett, Hall, Coombes, & 
McDermid, 1996) because a) phenomena in our context diagrams are normally events, handled 
well by a causal logic, b) 'a causes b' is well understood in requirements engineering, and c) 
causal logic introduces temporal properties without introducing the complexity of temporal 
modal logic. 
Three important points must be made about our behavior specifications: 
I. A statement A shal 1 cause D can be expressed as the propositional implication A --+ D. 
The emission of phenomenon A always results in the emission of phenomenon D. We 
recognize that such an expression assumes that the temporal properties of shall causeare 
not significant, and this assumption is either a trust assumption or must be explicitly 
investigated in the inner argument. 
2. The behavior specification is assumed to be complete, in that if the behavior specification 
consists of exactly A shal 1 cause D, then no phenomenon other than A Can cause D, and D 
cannot occur spontaneously. In other words, the mutual implication A +-+ D is true. 
3. Extending #2 above, if the behavior specification consists of some set of expressions 
A shall cause D, B shall cause D, andc shall cause D, then no phenomenon other 
than A, B, and c can cause D. Expressed as a mutual implication, this is (A IBIQ +-+ D. 
The behavior of the domains in Figure 6-3, expressed in our chosen notation in terms of the 
phenomena, is: 
UIperSNUM shall cause m1perSData 
A major problem is immediately exposed. Given what is seen in the behavior description, there 
is no way to connect the system's behavior to the security requirement, because the type of the 
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domain 'Users' is too general. It apparently includes all humans, regardless of whether or not 
they are HR staff members, or even employees. The formal argument cannot be constructed. A 
requirements1design iteration is required; the system designers must be asked for help. 
There are (at least) three design choices: 
1. Introduce a physical restriction, e. g., a guard, to change the type of the domain from 'Users' 
to 'FIR staff. Doing so would permit construction of the following outer argument (proof): 
H symbol defined as (user, member of HR because of the guard). 
I symbol defined as the occurrence of phenomenon uIperSNUM 
D symbol defined as the occurrence of phenomenon MIperSData 
1. 1D premise from the behavioral specification 
2. 1H premise if input entered, then user e HR (because of guard) 
3. D premise assume personal information is displayed 
4. DI split implication from #2 
5. 1 detach 3,4 
6. H conclusion detach 2,5 
2. Introduce phenomena into the system permitting authentication and authorization, thereby 
changing the type of the domain from 'Users' to 'HR staff. 
3. Introduce a trust assumption (TA) asserting that the type of the domain is 'IIR staff, even 
though no information is available to support the assertion. 
To make the example more interesting, we choose option 2, which requires a 
requirements1design iteration. When asked, the designers chose to use an existing password- 
based authentication mechanism. The following secondary security goal is added: 
SSG1: Users are to be authenticated as HR staff 
The requirements engineer returns to the box Construct System Context in stage one of the 
activity diagram (see Figure 5-3 in Chapter 5, on page 82). The appropriate domains and 
phenomena are added to the context. Passing through the remainder of stage one and then stages 
2 and 3 provides us with the following: 
e Functional requirements to manage the authentication system must be considered in stage 
1. However, as the authentication system already exists, no new functional requirements 
need be added. 
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Users 
a 1B 
P rsonal Provide HIR data Information 
------------- requested by user Machine + Only to HR staff HR Data 
b 
a. UlpersNumber(#, userlD, credentials) 
M! ( persData I NO 
Credentials Storage 
ýc 
b IVI'valiclate(userlD, credentials) 
CSI(YES I NO) 
Figure 6-4 - New HR staff problem diagram 
The information in the authentication system is an asset. Flowevcr, tile same comment as 
above still applies: no new goals need be added because the system already exists. 
No secondary security requirements need be added, because SSCj I did not cause any new 
assets or other secondary security goals to corne into existence. 
Figure 6-4 shows the resulting problem diagram that will be used in this second iteration of 
stage 4 of the activity diagram. The diagram shows that the user is to supply some sort of 
credentials along with the request for information. These credentials are passcd to the existing 
external authentication and authorization engine, which uses the internal predicate i sval id () to 
determine if the credentials are for a member of human resources and then answer yes or no. If 
the answer is yes, then the machine provides the data, otherwise the request is refused. The 
corresponding behavior specification is: 
1. u! perSNumber(#, userID, credentials) 
shall cause Wvalidate(usei-ID, credentials) 
2. m! validate(userID, credentials) and isvalid(userID, credentials) 
shall cause CS! YES 
3. m! validate(userlD, credentials) and not isvalid(userID, credentials) 
shall cause CS! NO 
4. CS! YES shall cause M! persData 
S. CS! NO shall cause M! NO 
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One can now construct the satisfaction argument for the reformulated problem. One begins 
with the outer argument, first defining the symbols to be used. These symbols are shown in the 
following table. 
Symbol Derived from (see Figure 6-4) 
1: InputRequest U! versNumber(#, userlD, credentials) 
V: CredsPresentedForValidation M! validate(userlD, credentials) 
Y: ReplyYes CS! YES 
D: Displaylnfo M! persData 
C: CredsAreValid isValid(userlD, credentials) 
H: Member0fl-IR Conclusion: user is member of HR 
We derive the following predicate logic premises from the behavioral specification. These 
prcmiscs arc the grounds used in the formal argument and, if necessary, will be supported by 
informal arguments. 
Name Premise Description 
PI I --+ V Behavior specification statement #1 
P2 CH Definition of isValid: if credentials are valid then user is a 
member of HR. 
P3 Y (C & V) Behavioral descriptions #2 and #3: a Yes happens only if 
credentials are presented for validation, then validated. 
Derived from the mutual implication (C & V) +-+ Y that 
converts to ((C & V) --+ Y) & (Y --+ (C & V)) 
P4 DY Behavior descriptions #4 and #5: display happens onlTif the 
S answer from behavior descriptions #2 and #3 was CS! YE. 'S 
As the requirement is that information be displayed only to a member of HR, D is included as 
a premise and H as the conclusion. Thus, one wants to show: 
(Pl, P2, P3, P4, D I- H). 
A proof is shown in Figure 6-5. 
1 1 --+ V (Premise P I) 
2 C --+ H (Premise P2) 
3 Y-+ C&V (Premise P3) 
4 D -+ Y (Premise P4) 
5 D (Premise) 
6 Y (Detach (-+ elimination), 4,5) 
7 C&V (Detach, 3,6) 
8 v (Split (& elimination), 7) 
9 C (Split (& elimination), 7) 
10 11 (Detach, 2,9) 
11 D --* H (Conclusion, 5 leads to 10) 
Figure 6-5 - Proof th at the security argument Is satisried 
105 
Chapter 6. Security Requirement Satisfaction Arguments 
6.2.1.2 The Inner Arguments 
Each of the rules used in the outer argument should be examined critically. We choose 
premises P I, P3, & P4 for initial consideration. These premises are probably not controversial, 
because one can say that they are part of the specification of the system to be implemented. The 
arguments thus consist of one trust assumption, as shown in the following utterance in our 
argument language: 
let G1 = "system will be correctly implemented"; 
given grounds G1 thus claim Pi. 
given grounds G1 thus claim P3. 
given grounds G1 thus claim P4. 
Premise P2 is more complex. This premise is making the claim that instances of the domain 
'Users' are limited to be instances of the subtype 'HR members', because only HR members 
have valid credentials. We show an argument for this claim below. This argument incorporates 
three trust assumptions: G2, G3, and G4. 
given grounds 
G2: "Valid credentials are given only to HR members" 
warranted by 
given grounds 
G3: "Credentials are given in person" 
warranted by 
G4: "Credential administrators are honest & reliable" 
thus claim 
Cl: "Credential administration is correct" 
thus claim 
P2: "HR credentials provided --> HR member" 
rebutted by 
Rl: "HR member is dishonest", 
R2: "social engineering attack succeeds", 
R3: "person keeps credentials when changing depts" 
The three rebuttals in the argument require some treatment. Recall that rebuttals express 
conditions under which the argument does not hold. If the rebuttals remain in the argument, they 
create implicit trust assumptions saying that the conditions expressed in the rebuttals will not 
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occur, which may be acceptable. Alternatively, one could construct an argument against a 
rebuttal. If the stakeholder is unwilling to accept the rebuttals, then the system must somehow 
be changed to mitigate them. We examine a mitigation of RI in the next section. 
6.2.2 Removing Rebuttals by Adding Secondary Security Goals 
At times, the most straightforward way to remove a rebuttal might be to add functionality to a 
system, which is done by adding secondary security goals, then passing back through the 
activities to see if new functional requirements are added, as well as new assets and security 
requirements. This process would permit adding new grounds or warrants to mitigate the 
conditions that permit the rebuttal. 
As an example, consider a dishonest HR member selling credentials (an instance Of R1). One 
could mitigate this risk by increasing the probability that an unusual use of the employee's 
credentials would be detected, thus raising the probability that the misuse would be detected. 
This is new functionality. 
As already noted, the framework permits addition of new functionality by adding secondary 
security goals and then satisfying these goals. In this example, the secondary security goal to 
add is 
SSG2: ensure that HR members do not sell credentials. 
After adding this goal, a requirementsIdesign iteration is required to add sufficient design 
information to the context to be able to satisfy this security goal. We pass back to stage I in our 
activity diagram (see Figure 5-3 in Chapter 5, on page 82) and pass to the step elicillrevise 
functional requirements. In this example, one might add two functional requirements to the 
system in order to satisfy SSG2: 
" FR2: all uses of HR credentials shall be logged 
" FR3: any use Of HR credentials from a location outside the HR 
department shall be immediately signaled by email to the HR director. 
As the context does not contain the phenomena required to satisfy these functional 
requirements, the context is revisited and appropriate phenomena added. 
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After passing through stages two and three of the activity diagram, these ftinctional 
requirements would then be used in stage 4 as grounds in an argument against the rebuttal RI: 
given grounds 
GS: "uses of HR creds are logged (see FR2)" 
and 
G6: "uses of HR creds from outside are emailed to HR director (see FR3),, 
warranted by 
G7: "these actions increase the probability of detecting improper cred use" 
and 
G8: "the employee does not want to get caught" 
thus claim 
C2: "HR members will not sell their credentials". 
C2 is added as a mitigating proposition to the rebuttal in argument 1. 
Rl: NR member is dishonest" mitigated by C2 
The passing through of stages 2 and 3 of the activity diagram needs further discussion. In our 
framework, one must ask if the new functional requirements FR2 and FR3 give rise to new assets 
and therefore new security goals (stage 2), and whether any existing or new security goals that 
are applied to functional requirements gives rise to new security requirements (stage 3). In the 
current example, at least one new asset has been created: the access log. One could argue that 
the HR director's email has become an asset, or has at least changed character. Analysis of these 
assets would produce threat descriptions (one threat description produced might be falter, 
log data, inability to verify honestyl), which would lead to new secondary security 
goals in stage 2, which would lead to new secondary security requirements in stage 3, which 
would lead to additional satisfaction arguments. The process continues until an acceptable set of 
satisfactory arguments is constructed. 
6.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter described our third contribution, the structured fonnal and informal 
argumentation to verify that a system can satisfy its security requirements by being sufficiently 
convincing that the system can satisfy the security requirements laid upon it. The formal 
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argument is used to prove a system can satisfy its security requirements, drawing upon claims 
about a system's behavior. The informal arguments are used to support the claims made in the 
first argument about system behavior and characteristics. These two part satisfaction arguments 
provide assurance by combining formal proof with evidence-based argumentation. They assist 
with determining security-relevant system properties, and inconsistent or implausible 
assumptions about them. 
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We applied our framework in the "CRISTAL UK! ' project (Watson, 2006), a research 
initiative, managed by NATS (formerly National Air Traffic Services) for the 
EUROCONTROL CASCADE Programme. Although safety issues raised by potential use of the 
new technology are well understood and are being fully considered by the project, potential 
changes in security requirements are less well understood. Therefore, our goals were to gain 
experience with the application of our framework to validate its utility, and to discover security 
requirements in our chosen problem domain. 
The experience was very revealing. For the project, we exposed assumptions and potential 
security problems that may need to be considered; determining precisely what actions to take is 
a future task for the project and will be based on a risk assessment. As for the framework, our 
systematic argumentation exposed hidden assumptions about system behavior that led to 
potential security problems. However, we also exposed problems with our framework: 
constructing and understanding the formal arguments, representation of the informal arguments, 
and determining the size and content of the system context used for analysis. 
This chapter is structured as follows. It begins in Section 7.1, with a detailed overview of the 
project and the technology. Section 7.2 presents the analysis. Section 7.3 discusses lessons 
learned, and Section 7.4 concludes. 
7.1 Project Overview 
The "CRISTAL UK7 project (Watson, 2006) is a research initiative, managed by NATS for 
the EUROCONTROL CASCADE Programme in collaboration with Raytheon Systems 
Limited, SITA and QinetiQ. 
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The project is charged with "determining the role of 'passive surveillance' in NATS future 
surveillance system[s]" (Watson, 2006). It is investigating the potential role of passive 
surveillance technologies in air traffic control areas where radar is used currently, such as in and 
around the airspace at busy airports. 
In the context of this project, passive surveillance means using information broadcast by 
aircraft, without any active request or interrogation, to derive surveillance information about the 
aircraft, such as its position. This is opposed to active surveillance, which uses transmissions 
from a ground system (e. g., radar) to determine the location of an aircraft or to generate a 
response from it. 
The members of the team have different roles in the project. NATS is responsible for the 
CRISTAL UK project and its deliverables. The Open University is not responsible for any 
deliverables in the project, but instead has a limited advisory role. Nonetheless, we hope that the 
requirements the project developed and, more importantly, the arguments, rebuttals, and 
mitigations that our analysis generated, will find their place in the project's delivered analysis. 
7.1.1 Background- Air Traffic Control 
Air Traffic Control is responsible for the safe and efficient movement of aircraft through a 
given airspace. Unfortunately, 'safe' and 'efficient' are at odds with each other. An empty 
airspace is a safe one - no loss of life or property due to problems with aircraft is possible - but 
it is also a very inefficient one. One increases efficiency by adding aircraft into the airspace, 
which increases risk that an accident (or an intentional act leading to loss) will occur. Air traffic 
controllers try to keep the risk low by maintaining safe horizontal and vertical distances 
(separation) between aircraft. To do so, air traffic controllers must know the identity and 
position of aircraft with a high degree of accuracy, integrity, and assurance. 
7.1.2 Separation 
The most important job of an air traffic controller is to maintain a safe separation between 
aircraft while ensuring that the aircraft get to where they want to go. The minimum separation 
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between aircraft at a given time is dependent on many factors, including the speed of aircraft, 
surveillance accuracy, the ability to communicate with aircraft and between controllers, the 
redundancy of surveillance systems, and the ability to spot and rectify mistakes. 
Most of the factors are strongly influenced by how often the controller is told where an 
aircraft actually is, as opposed to where it is supposed to be. The more often positions are 
reported, the more accurate the controller's picture of the airspace is, assuming that the position 
reports are correct. The controller determines aircrafts' positions using active and passive 
surveillance. 
7.1.3 Active versus Passive Surveillance 
Active surveillance describes a process to determine the position of aircraft independently of 
where the aircraft thinks it is. There are two systems in use: primary radar and secondary radar. 
Primary radar operates by broadcasting directional pulses and listening for pulses reflected off 
aircraft. This system is independent because no help is required from the aircraft to be detected 
by the radar. Primary radar can only provide the position of the aircraft. Secondary radar 
operates by using highly directional transmissions of enquiries. Aircraft are expected to respond 
to the query in a fixed time. The position of the aircraft is determined from the position of the 
antenna and the time required to hear a response from an aircraft. The response can (and does) 
contain information, such as the aircraft's identity and its altitude. Where primary radar is 
considered independent, secondary radar can be considered to be 'cooperative' surveillance. 
As secondary radar depends upon the aircraft responding to an enquiry, it will not detect 
aircraft that do not respond. Typically, primary and secondary radar antennae arc installed 
together on the same rotating mount and used together to complement one another. If the 
primary radar detects something that is not responding to secondary radar enquiries, the air 
traffic controller can take appropriate action. 
Passive surveillance consists of equipment that listens for transmissions from aircraft, then 
computes the position using that transmission; the surveillance system makes no request of the 
aircraft for transmission. There are two general techniques in use: 
113 
Chapter 7. Evaluation 
e The aircraft broadcasts its identity and position information. The surveillance system uses 
the information as is. 
The surveillance system uses a network of multiple receivers and multilateration 
(intersection of the hyperboloids described by the difference in arrival time of the 
transmission at each receiver) to determine the position of the transmitter. 
The first technique is known as ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast). It 
uses satellite navigation technology on board the aircraft to determine where the aircraft is, and 
then broadcasts that position to other users without the need for any pilot input or radar 
interrogation. This technique depends upon the aircraft knowing its accurate position. An 
aircraft that either maliciously or through equipment failure reports an incorrect position will be 
misplaced; the only sanity check available is to check if a position report makes sense (is 
credible). Receiving credible but erroneous information is a key problem to be addressed. 
While ADS-B can be used by ground users as a replacement for traditional surveillance 
techniques like radar, it is also seen as an enabling technology for new methods of air traffic 
control. The broadcast of surveillance data that can be received by all users, including other 
aircraft, may permit tasks normally undertaken by a controller to be delegated to the pilot. These 
ideas are encompassed in the concept of Airborne Separation Assistance Systems (ASAS) 
(Cervo, 2005). 
The second technique has similar characteristics to secondary radar; the computation of the 
position depends solely upon the timing of receipt of signals. 
Neither secondary radar nor one of the passive surveillance techniques can detect aircraft that 
are not co-operating. 
7.1.4 Increasing Use ofPassive Surveillance 
The use of passive surveillance has become more attractive to Air Traffic Control Service 
Providers (ANSPs) in recent years because aircraft are increasingly being equipped with 
suitable avionics. In addition to the perceived operational benefits of these technologies, there 
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are potentially significant cost savings in procurement and through-life maintenance costs of 
these technologies over traditional surveillance means. 
According to EUROCONTROL, increased use of passive surveillance should bring the 
following benefits (list quoted from (Rekkas, 2005)): 
e Reduced ground infrastructure cost, resulting in a lower cost base and higher Efficiency. 
Reduced controller and pilot workload, and thus increased productivity achieved by the 
introduction of automated support, the reduction of voice communications workload and 
the automation of routine aircrew and controller tasks. This will lead to Capacity and 
Safety benefits. 
e Increased flexibility, achieved by the provision of a new communications medium that 
aircrew and controllers can use in combination with existing voice communications. This 
is expected to lead to Efficiency and Safety benefits. 
* Improved pilot and controller situational awareness and monitoring, achieved by an 
increase in the availability and quality of the information (e. g., from aircraft systems). This 
will lead to Capacity, Efficiency and Safety benefits. 
* More balanced distribution of tasks among pilots and controllers achieved through an 
improved task distribution in ATC sectors and the delegation of tasks from the controller 
to the pilot. This will lead to Capacity, Efficiency and Safety benefits. 
e More balanced distribution of workload between different ATC sectors achieved through 
the introduction of new procedures supported by automation that will enable the transfer of 
some tasks to adjacent sectors. 
The US Fcderal Aviation Authority has a vcry similar list (Fcderal Aviation Administration, 
2003). The open question, and the reason for the existence of many projects including 
CRISTAL UK, is whether these benefits can be obtained with adequate safety and security. 
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7.1.5 Using ADS-B to Achieve the Benefits 
In order to obtain the majority of the benefits of passive surveillance, there must be aircraft- 
based equipment available that reports the required information about the aircraft. The ADS-B 
standard and complying equipment will meet this need. 
ADS-B-equipped aircraft broadcast information approximately once per second. These 
transmissions include information about the position and status of the aircraft. The information 
is broadcast in various messages that include airborne position, surface position, aircraft 
identification and type, airborne velocity, and aircraft operational status messages (CASA, 
2004). This information is collected by ADS-B receivers and then passed to air traffic control 
processing systems to be displayed to the controller, either on existing displays (preferred) or on 
some new display. The information broadcast by an ADS-B system is derived both from the 
avionic systems in the aircraft (e. g., air speed, barometric altitude, aircraft status) and from 
satellite navigation equipment (e. g., surface position, geometric altitude, and ground speed). 
ADS-B messages are not 'signed' in any fashion; one cannot verify that a message actually 
comes from the aircraft identified in the contents of the message. 
7.2 The Security Requirements Analysis 
The project asks whether ADS-B position reports can (or should) be considered to be a 
primary position source. We analyzed the security implications of this position using our 
framework by stepping through the activities in Figure 5-3 in Chapter 5, on page 82. The 
sections below are numbered using iteration. stage, where 'stage' comes from Figure 5-3. For 
example, the second stage of the first iteration will be numbered 1.2. 
7.2.1 The First Iteration 
During this first iteration, we established the context for the system, the functional 
requirements, and the primary security goals & requirements. 
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Transmitted ATS-B messages 
Positions when ADS_B V Airplanes 
- GPS recelv ý Receiver vv/ADS-B :ý 
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Machine 
Provide positions of airplanes 
PositioLhýe 
ýr ATC A, 
needed 
System 
C 
Figure 7-1 - System context - 
Iteration one 
Step 1.1 - ldentiýy Functional Requirements. 
In this stage of the activity diagrarn, we identified the business goal(s) of the system under 
analysis, described the context, and identified the functional requirement(s). This task was 
drarnatically simplified because working ADS-B equipment was supplied by project partners 
and the initial business goal was given. That business goal was: 
BG1: Provide safe and efficient air traffic management. 
Given the above goal and project's rernit, the functional requircinent can be summarized by: 
FR1: Provide positions of aircraft. 
The only task rcmaining was to determine the context, which Is slimvii in Figure 7- 1. 
Step 1.2 - ldentilýy Security Goals. 
This step was charged with determining the assets involved with the system, the harnis that 
the assets can suffer (directly or indirectly), and finally the security goals to avoid those harms. 
The direct assets found From the context are GlIS receivers and signals, aircral't, positions of' 
the aircraft (broadcast), ground receivers, and the ATC systern Oncluding tile controllers). The 
indirect assets are the contents ol'the aircraft (e. g., passengers), itenis around the ATC area (e. g., 
buildings, infrastructure, potentially the airport), and tile aircralt owner's business (e. g., 
Nputation, profitability, etc. ). 
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Using this list of assets, we can (with the help of the project's domain experts) determine the 
harms involved in the system, and then the threat descriptions expressed as violation ofgeneral 
security goal on asset can cause harm. The threat descriptions arc: 
General goal: confidentiality: 
T1: {publicizing, airplanes' position, facilitating attack in air) 
T2: (publicizing, airplanes' position, loss of trade secretsl 
The stakeholders made the decision that threats TI & T2 are outside of the project's remit. 
General goal: integrity 
T3: (-correct, airplanes' position, 
crashl 
T4: (-correct, airplanes' position, 
separationj 
TS: (-correct, airplanes' position, 
lost property due to collision or 
lost revenue due to increased 
lost revenue due to lost confidencel 
Gcneral goal: availability 
T6: (-available, airplanes' position, 
collision/crashl 
T7: (-available, airplanes' position, 
separationj 
T8: (-available, airplanes' position, 
confidencel 
lost property due to 
lost revenue due to increased 
lost revenue due to lost 
The security goals are determined by avoiding the action in the threat descriptions. Given these 
threat descriptions, the security goals are: 
SG1: Have correct positions (avoids T3, T4, and TS) 
SG2: Report positions on a timely basis (avoids T6, T7, T8) 
Step 1.3 - Identify Security Requirements. 
In this step, we determined the constraints to place on the functional requirement FR1: 
Provide positions of airplanes. We did this by composing the security goals and the 
functional requirement, resulting in a constrained functional requirement. 
The composition produces two security requirements (constraints). The first is 
SR1 EFR1: Provide positions of aircraft]: positions shall be accurate. 
118 
7.2. 
AP! XMIT APIRECV 
Airplane transmits Airplane receives 
accurate position accurate GPS info 
RISEND 
Receiver sends 
positions 
ADS-B V Airplanes V GPS Receiver w/ADS-B 
Machine 
Provide positions of airplanes 
positions must be aGcurate 
ATC positions must be timely 
MIPOSREPORT System 
ATCIHASPOS 
Positions sent & 
up to date 
Figure 7-2 - Context with constrained requirement 
The NATS requirement for accuracy is that the aircralt be within 300 Incters of' its rcportcd 
position when the position is received. Ilowevcr, ADS-B can potcritially 1111pi'me on that by an 
order of magnitude, and the conseqLlenccs of this ITILIst be studied. SR I operationah/c., S( ; 1. 
The second constraint is 
SR2 EFR1: Provide positions of airplanes]: positions shall be timely. 
The NATS requirement for timeliness is that a new position be received %N Ithin 4 to 6 -second,, of 
the last position report, or ofthe aircraft entering controlled airspace. SR2 operationall/cs S( j2. 
Figure 7-2 shows the context with the constraints. 
An informal satisfaction argument that SR1 and SR2 satisfy SG1 and SG2 is ws I*ollo%%s: the 
goal SG1 is satisfied because accurate positions arc available ý, vhen needed (SRI and SR? ), all(I 
SG2 is satisfied directly by SR2. 
Step 1.4 - Satisfaction Arguments 
We began by constructing the forl-nal outer argument. The steps are I) annotate tile context 
with the phenomena exchanged between domains, 2) develop a behavioral specification fol tile 
system in terms of the phenomena, and then 3) use tile phenomena and hchm loral spec iI icat ion 
in a proof that if they are complete, the systern can satisfy the security rcquircnient. s. 
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The Phenomena 
Figure 7-2 shows the phenomena exchanged within the system and used in the behavior 
specification. The naming convention is "sending domain! message". The phenomena are: 
AP I RECV: The airplane receives GPS broadcasts. 
AP 1 XMIT: The airplane transmits its position. 
RI SEND: The receiver sends the received position to the machine. 
M1 POSREPORT: The machine sends the position to the ATC system. 
ATCIHASPOS: The ATC confirms that it has the aircraft's position. 
The Behavior Specification 
The behavioral specification is built using the variant of the causal logic described in 
Chapter 6 Section 6.2.1. For this project's ATC system, the behavioral specification is: 
APIRECV shall cause APIXMIT 
ANXMIT shall cause RISEND 
RISEND shall cause MIPOSREPORT 
MIPOSREPORT shall cause ATCIHASPOS 
We recognized that reception of GPS signals by the aircraft will not actually cause the aircraft to 
transmit position reports, but instead enables them. We chose to accept this slight misstatement 
instead of adding a clock to the context and changing to a temporal logic. As a consequence, 
APIRECV shall cause APIXMIT embeds the assumption that it repeats often enough to satisfy 
the NATS requirement. We also assumed that each processing step in the system will complete 
in an appropriate amount of time, again to avoid changing to a temporal logic. 
The Outer (Formal) Argument 
There was now enough information to construct the outer argument, a proof that the system 
can respect the security requirements. We want to prove that 
APIRECV [- ATCIHASPOS 
If we can prove this, then we have proved that the system can satisfy both SR1 (accuracy) and 
SR2 (timeliness), given the following assumptions: 1) the context is correct and the 
implementation introduces no conflicting behavior, and 2) the temporal properties assumed 
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1. AP 1 RECV 4 AP 1 XMIT (premi se) 
2. APIXMIT 4 R! SEND (premise) 
3. R! SEND 4 MIPOSREPORT (premise) 
4. WPOSREPORT 4 ATCIHASPOS (premise) 
5. AP! RECV (assumption) 
6. AP! XMIT (Detach, 1, 5) 
7. R! SEND (Detach, 2, 6) 
8. WPOSREPORT (Detach, 3, 7) 
9. ATC! HASPOS (Detach, 4, 8) 
Figure 7-3 - The outer argument (proof) 
above are not significant. Some of these assumptions will be challenged when we build the 
inner arguments. 
A proof is shown in Figurc 7-3. 
The Inner Arguments 
The premises and assumptions of the outer argument comprise a set of assumptions that must 
hold for the system to be secure. The purpose of the inner arguments is to challenge these 
assumptions in order to establish whether they hold in the real world. In our case, steps I 
through 5 in Figure 7-3 are the assumptions to be challenged. 
As explained in Chapter 6 Section 6.1.2, we chose to represent arguments in our framework 
in a text form because this form handles complex grounds-to-clairn graphs and recursion in the 
arguments more naturally. The argument for the initial premise AP! RECV 4 ANXMIT in this 
form is: 
given grounds 
Received GPS positions are accurate (AP! RECV& assumptions) 
warranted by 
Calculations are accurate (assumption) 
thus claim 
Airplanes transmit accurate positions (AP! XMIT) 
[rebutted by ... ] 
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Figure 74 - Argument for AP! RECV 4 AP! XMIT 
One of our first lessons learned was 
that although it is easy to understand 
the text representation of an argument 
when the argument is simple, 
understanding by project members 
became more difficult as the 
arguments become more complex. As 
such, we changed to a modified form of the argument diagrams Toulmin proposed. Figure 7-4 
shows the argument in this form, along with the newly added rebuttals. The text in parentheses 
ADS-B 
transmission 
are received 
R1.4: Receiver is sabotaged. (SR2) 
R1.5: Transmissions are jammed. ( 
Figure 7-5 - Argument for AMMIT 4 R! SEND 
Rcvrsends [ 
accurate Positions sent 
position to TC 
] 
C to ATC 
Machine 
R1.6: Rcvr sabotaged - pos. wrong. (SR1)- 
RIJ: Network sabotaged - no xTR77(S_ki)_] 
Figure 7-6 - Argument for R! SEND 4 WPOSREPORT 
Machine 
sends 
Position ! Pos ý POSI 
accurate pos. 
t elpl 
m 
receipt' 
confirmed rmf to ATC 
R1.9: M sabotaged - pos. wrong. 
R1.10: Network sabotaged - no xmit (SR2)1 
Figure 7-7 - Argurnent for M! POSREPORT 4 ATCHASPOS 
GPS Airc 
satellites are 
operational 
RI. 12*G Sjammed. (SR2) 
Figure 7-8 - Argument for AP! RECV 
(e. g., SR2) is the security 
requirement that is violated if the 
rebuttal is true. Figure 7-5 through 
Figure 7-8 show the arguments for 
premises 2 through 4 (numbers of the 
lines in the proof), and for the 
assumption (line 5). 
Tbcre are 12 rebuttals in the 
arguments. These rebuttals fall into 
three general categories: sabotage 
where equipment is sabotaged to 
break it (RIA, RI. 2, RIA, and RI. 6 
through R1.11), externally caused 
denial of service (RI. 5 and RI. 12), 
and the intentional transmission of 
incorrect data (RI. 3). Each of these 
rebuttals should be evaluated to 
determine whether it should be 
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mitigated, and it' so how. If a rebuttal is to be mitigated, then iteration is required. The project 
assumed that R1.3 presented an unacceptable risk of terrorism; aircraft believed to be following 
some track X but really going somewhere else could do a great deal ofdarnage. 
Note that rebuttals that are safety concerns are not considered here. For example, the 
equivalent of 'jamming' can be caused by natural phenornena such as intiltipath and clectrical 
interference. We consider these to be naturally occurring behavior, and theref'Ore to be 
considered during a safety analysis. 
7.2.2 The Second Iteration 
In order to mitigate RI. 3, we needed to find a way to know that the position an aircraft 
transmits is the true position of the aircraft. We were less concerned with detecting that in 
aircraft transmitting a correct position is using the wrong identity. 
Multilateration can be used to determine the position ot'a transmitter, computing the position 
by measuring the difference in a transmission's arrival time at multiple receivers. We chose this, 
approach, and changed the context appropriately. The new context is shown in Figure 7-9. 
Stepping through the frarnework, we see that we do not have any new fillictional 
requirements (we put aside administration of tile multilateration systeni). %k, e (10 11,1%e new 
assets, the multilateration computers, but they did not add any new security goals. ill thc context 
of this project. As such, our security requirements did not change. 
Position with Transmitted ATS-B 
reception time messages 
Multilat 
_y_ 
ADS-B 
_y, 
Airplanes 
GPS 
Computer Receiver vv/ADS-B 
CC BI C, 
positions 
I 
Time 
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Positionswh,, 
ATC 
needed 
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C 
Figure 7-9 
- 
Context diagram, iteration t"o 
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The behavior specification does have a significant change. We must describe the behavior of 
the new component in the context. The behavior specification is now: 
APIRECV shall cause APIXMIT 
AP! XMIT shall cause R! SEND 
RISEND shall cause MCISEND 
MCIXMIT shall cause MIPOSREPORT 
MIPOSREPORT shall cause ATCIHASPOS 
We now have a new premise in our proof, corresponding to the new component of the behavior 
specification. 
We learned another lesson at this point. It was easier to describe the effects of the iteration 
using a graphical 'sub-argument' technique, rather than expressing the arguments again. This 
technique applies the mitigation directly to the rebuttal in the argument developed during the 
first iteration. We used that technique here. Figure 7-10 shows the resulting argument and 
mitigation. The figure also shows the next set of rebuttals, described in the next paragraph. 
The first rebuttal (R2.1.1) challenges the assumption that the transmitter is actually in the 
airplane it says it is in, or is even in an airplane. One could have a small airplane accompanying 
a large one. The small plane broadcasts the position, which would permit the large airplane to 
divert. Alternatively, one could have a series of transmitters in cars, pretending to be the 
airplane. The second rebuttal (R2.1.2) challenges the assumption that there is a transmitter 
where multilateration says it is. It is possible to use multiple transmitters and vary the timing to 
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Figure 7-10 - Arguments for the second iteration 
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create 'virtual transmitters' at any position (Capkun & Hubaux, 2004). The third rebuttal 
(R2.1.3) challenges the assumption that the clocks in the receivers are synchronized. It is 
possible to perturb the clock at particular receivers, which would cause the position calculation 
to be offset. More detail on this rebuttal would require looking at specific multilateration time 
synchronization solutions. 
7.2.3 The ThirdIteration 
A third iteration would be required to deal with rebuttals R2.1. *, assuming that the risks are 
determined significant, which at first glance they appear to be. For example, primary radar 
mitigates all of them, because it gives a reliable indication that something really is at the 
position reported, and that there is not something elsewhere. R2.1.2 could possibly be mitigated 
by using antennae that provide an approximation of the 'angle off of horizontal' of a 
transmission. R2.1.3 can be mitigated by use of a secure clock synchronization technology. 
7.3 Lessons Learned 
This experience taught us several things about using our framework in a real project setting. 
The outer (formal) arguments were difficult to construct and explain. One problem was the 
nature of the proof. The outer argument proves that if the assumptions are valid, if the behavior 
specification is correct, and if there are no other behaviors, then the system can be secure. It 
does not prove that a system will be secure. Given these distinctions, some people did not see 
their utility and wanted to skip directly to the inner arguments. However, in our framework it is 
the outer arguments that provide the assumptions that the inner arguments test, so skipping this 
step was not appropriate. We need to find a better way to motivate, capture, and represent the 
outer arguments. 
It is worth noting that the need to test the assumptions flowing from the outer arguments (the 
premises) did not present a problem. People seemed to enjoy constructing the inner arguments. 
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The project members were happier using a graphical representation of the inner 
arguments, even though the representation had less expressive power than text representation. 
This, plus the desire to bypass the outer arguments, led to us using the rebuttal, mitigation, 
rebuttal graphical argument form. Unfortunately, there are many arguments that would not be 
easy to express completely in this form, such as when a mitigation requires a warrant or covers 
several rebuttals. Tool support for converting between the text and graphical forms and for 
graphically rendering summary arguments would be very helpful. 
Domain knowledge is certainly required, but can sometimes lead people not to question 
assumptions. We found that it was easy for domain experts implicitly to assume that something 
behaves in manner X because that is how it has always done. We found that having domain non- 
experts in a project helped; it seemed that someone from outside was more likely to ask "why is 
that? " at odd times. It should be noted that once the questions were asked, we had no problem 
having lively and productive discussions. 
Security problems expand the system context in unexpected ways. For example, the 
buildings in a city are (usually) not considered part of an ATC problem until considering 
whether someone will decide to fly into one. Neither are the GPS satellite signals, until GPS 
jammers are considered. The challenge we faced was to expand the context as much as 
necessary, but no more so than that. 
Iteration is required, especially when considering mitigations. However, iteration requires 
careful management to ensure that interactions are detected. The choice to represent mitigations 
in the context of their rebuttals led naturally to considering them one at a time, when in fact they 
should be considered together as part of a complete analysis. For example, it makes sense to 
consider all the jamming scenarios together (e. g., ADS-B jamming, clock sync jamming, GPS 
jamming), instead of considering them independently. 
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7.4 Conclusions 
We had two goals for the project: to gain experience with the application of our framework to 
validate its utility, and to discover security requirements in our chosen problem domain. As we 
used the framework to produce security requirements, rebuttals, and mitigations that had not 
previously been considered, we consider that we succeeded with both goals. 
Two particular future work items deserve mention. The project showed the need for more 
tool support for representing outer arguments, and we are adding this task to our near-term 
future work list. The effort also showed the need for work on better enabling construction and 
understanding of the outer (formal) arguments by people who do not normally use formality, 
which is a longer-term research question. 
127 
Chapter 7. Evaluation 
128 
Chapter 8. Discussion & Future Work 
We presented three contributions in this thesis. Recapitulating from Chapter 1, the first is a 
security requirements framework incorporating a coherent definition of what security 
requirements are and an explicit recognition of the importance of context: the world within 
which the system and the potential attackers exist. The second is trust assumptions, making 
their role in security requirements explicit. The third is two-part satisfaction arguments for 
validating whether the system can satisfy the security requirements, incorporating a formal part 
to establish what premises are key for security, and an informal part to challenge the premises 
and the trust assumptions that support them. These contributions work together to support 
security requirements engineering where a) asset and security goal analysis are done in the 
business context of the system, b) the effects of security requirements on the functional 
requirements are understood, c) design constraints are taken into account, and d) the satisfaction 
of security requirements is established through the use of arguments. The usefulness of the 
contributions has been validated through constructed examples, an industrial case study, and 
peer review. 
Of course, questions and challenges have been raised during the research, and more work 
remains to be done. Some challenges are described in Section 8.1. Section 8.2 discusses future 
work, and this thesis concludes with Section 8.3. 
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8.1 Questions & Challenges 
Several challenging questions were raised during our research. 
8.1.1 Problem vs. Solution Space 
A reasonable objection to the framework described in this thesis is that one is designing the 
system in order to determine its requirements. To some extent, this is true; the details of the 
system and its domains are being refined iteratively. 
However, although it is true that the system and system context are being determined, the 
software design is not. What is being specified are the inputs and outputs (the phenomena) that 
the software will see and produce. By iterating between requirements and design, the 
environment (or context) that the software lives within is being refined to include additional 
domains that need to exist, and additional phenomena required to make use of these domains. 
8.1.2 Traceability ofSecondary Security Functional Requirements 
Adding functionality to support security requirements creates a traceability problem. This 
issue was raised during the discussion of SeDAn in Chapter 3 Section 3.1.3. Chapter 6 provided 
two examples where this sort of functionality was added: addition of credential verification to 
pennit the outer argument to be constructed, and addition of monitoring and logging 
functionality to support removal of the dishonest employee rebuttal. Chapter 7 provided another, 
the addition of multilateration. Although potentially one could trace back through the recursion 
in the process to connect the functions and the security requirement they support, it would be 
best if these functions remained strongly connected because the need for these functions could 
change or disappear if the security requirement changes. Currently, no mechanisms for 
maintaining such traceability arc provided in the framework, beyond tracing mitigations to their 
rebuttals. Such mechanisms would be part of any eventual tool support. 
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8.1.3 Representing all Security Requirements as Constraints 
Representing some security requirements as constraints can feel awkward. For example, 
consider the following security management principle 
Encryption shall be of the highest quality available. 
Adding the above as a constraint on every functional requirement could be problematic, because 
many of the functions do not have any obvious relationship to encryption. The constraint would 
appear as a restriction on who is allowed to view/access the information being encrypted, but 
this is one level removed from the principle. 
Our position is that if a general security principle similar to the one presented above is to 
have any effect on the behavior of the system, it will appear either as a security requirement (a 
direct constraint) or as a trust assumption in an argument. For example, if the context includes a 
wireless LAN and there is an access constraint on the function, then the outer argument (proof) 
must include a premise stating that information on the LAN cannot be vicwed/altcred by 
unauthorized parties or, more probably, is viewable only by authorized parties. This premise 
could be supported by an inner argument referring to the quality of the encryption, thereby 
indirectly constraining the problem to satisfy the encryption goal. 
8.1.4 Representing Required Behavior as Constraints 
In many cases, constraints describe what a system must do, as opposed to what a system must 
not do. Although these cases are indeed constraints in the sense that they limit the choices 
available to the requirements engineer and architects, the terminology feels backwards to users. 
8.1.5 Consistency of Trust Assumptions 
One trust assumption should be consistent with (should not conflict with) another trust 
assumption. Given that by definition trust assumptions are not argued (if they are, they become 
claims), there is no mechanism in place to help assure this consistency. 
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A similar problem exists with respect to arguments. Nothing in the framework verifies that 
two arguments are consistent with each other, or that one argument depends on some trust 
assumption T, and some other argument depends on not T. 
Resolving these issues involves solving some difficult issues. See Section 8.2.1 for more 
detail. 
8.1.6 Trust Assumptions - Creation of Obligations 
Trust assumptions create what might be thought of as obligations on the domains to which 
the assumptions are attached. The domains are expected to perform as trusted, or to 
'competently, honestly, and dependably' conform to the trust assumption. One can say that 
domains are expected to discharge these obligations. This implies a stronger connection 
between domains and trust assumptions in inner arguments than currently exists in the 
framework. 
On the other hand, the idea that domains have obligations might lead to high-level 
(requirements) aspects. If multiple domains must discharge the same obligation, then there is 
crosscutting. This idea needs further exploring. 
8.1.7 RiskAnalysis 
The framework as described in this thesis assumes a binary level of confidence in trust 
assumptions, leading to a binary level of confidence in arguments that use the trust assumptions. 
The framework, and especially the arguments, should incorporate non binary-valued risk 
analysis. There are three principle points in the framework where finer-grained risk should be 
considered. 
e Trust assumptions: trust assumptions should carry a level of confidence that the trust 
assumption will hold true. 
Threat analysis: one should have an idea of the impact and likelihood of the realization of a 
threat, in order to ascertain whether mitigating the threat is worth the cost. 
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Arguments: The levels of confidence of trust assumptions used in an argument should 
aggregate somehow, resulting in a level of confidence for the argument. The level of 
confidence in an argument should take into account the implicit trust assumption that all 
rebuttals have been considered. This level of confidence must next be converted to the 
likelihood that a vulnerability exists that permits a threat to be realized. 
8.1.8 Satisfaction Arguments -Constructing Outer Arguments 
One issue in our framework is that the outer arguments (the formal proofs) are constructed in 
an ad hoc manner. This creates a barrier to general acceptance of the framework. As we noted in 
Chapter 7 Section 7.2, the outer arguments are difficult to construct and explain. More research 
is needed on proof construction aids, perhaps built directly from a behavior and phenomena 
specifications. We should also explore the issues and challenges of using a temporal logic for 
behavior specification, so that we could use some of the verification tools available for these 
logics. 
8.1.9 Satisfaction Arguments -Constructing Inner Arguments 
One question that arises is "how does the analyst find rebuttals, grounds, and warrants? " 
Unfortunately, we have no recipe, but a method inspired by the how/why questions used in 
goal-oriented requirements engineering methods such as KAOS ((van Larnswcerde, 2001) and 
many others) suggests itself Given a claim, the analyst asks 'why is this claim trueT and 'what 
happens if it is not trueT The analyst first chooses which claim is being argued, and then uses 
the 'why' question to gather the grounds that are pertinent to the claim along with the warrants 
that connect the grounds to the claim. The argument is then constructed. 
The analyst next asks the question "what can prevent this claim from being true? " The 
answers are the initial rebuttals. Some of these rebuttals will be challenges of the grounds or 
warrants; these create the need for sub-arguments where the challenged item is a claim. In other 
cases, the rebuttal will not be addressed, thereby creating an implicit trust assumption stating 
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that the event(s) described in the rebuttal are not to be considered. A third possibility is to add 
new grounds to the argument that remove the conditions assumed by the rebuttal. 
Referring again to Chapter 7 Section 7.2, the enthusiasm showed by people while 
constructing the arguments arguably mitigates the lack of a recipe. People enjoyed looking for 
ways to break assumptions. Although there is little evidence beyond impression and anecdote, it 
may be that the competitive aspect of finding rebuttals is a strength of our framework. 
8.1.10 Other Satisfaction Arguments in the Framework 
This thesis proposes satisfaction arguments for verifýdng that the security requirements can 
be satisfied by the system. There are two other security-related satisfaction arguments that could 
fit in the framework. The first is that the goals are complete and consistent; if all the goals are 
satisfied, then no harm can come through abuse of assets. The second is that the security 
requirements are complete and consistent; the set of security requirements has satisfied the set 
of security goals. One could also imagine an argument that the asset analysis is complete. This 
thesis does not address these other arguments. 
8.2 Future Work 
This section presents ideas for future research suggested by the work described in this thesis 
8.2.1 The Inner Argument 
One question that begs for attention is whether, and if so how, to formalize the inner 
arguments. If inner arguments are formalized, one can imagine tool support to validate the 
arguments, or perhaps even to generate proofs for them. However, before we continue we must 
determine what kinds of formal arguments are appropriate in our context. 
Fetzer, discussing the shortcomings of formal verification (1988), describes two different 
forms of argument: inductive and deductive. He characterizes them as follows (lbid: pg 105 1): 
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"Tbe features that distinguish (good) deductive arguments are the following: 
(a) they are demonstrative, i. e., if their premises were true, their conclusions could not be 
false (without contradiction); 
(b) they are non-ampliative, i. e., there is no information or content in their conclusions that 
is not already contained in their premises; and, 
(c) they are additive, i. e., the addition of further information in the form of additional 
premises can neither strengthen nor weaken these arguments, which are already 
maximally strong. " 
He next says that inductive arguments are non-demonstrative, ampliativc, and non-additive. 
"Inductive arguments are meant to be knowledge-expanding, while deductive arguments arc 
meant to be truth-preserving. " In other words, deductive arguments prove something about the 
world, and inductive arguments draw inferences about the world. Using these distinctions, he 
argues that deductive arguments can be used on algorithms, but not on programs. 
Fetzer's distinction between algorithms and programs (1988) is very relevant to security. 
Algorithms are intellectual entities, and therefore can be verified using deduction because the 
messiness of the world is excluded from the model. Programs run in messy environments, what 
Fetzer calls causal environments, and therefore formal verification using deduction is dubious 
because the model does not include all possible behavior. He argues that inductive arguments do 
work in the causal environments because inductive arguments permit the conclusion to be false 
even if the premises are all trueg. Inductive argumentation provides a structure, but does not 
place constraints on the world. This conclusion is significant when thinking about security, 
because one strategy used by attackers is to violate some assumption about the world, causing 
the system to do something outside what is intended. Consider using a deontic logic 
(McNamara, 2006) for the inner arguments, modeling arguments based on permission and 
I Having a false conclusion in the face of true premises can happen if an ampliative step becomes invalid through addition of 
another true premise. Consider the following example: 300 people queried said A, therefore most people say A. This argument can 
be contradicted by adding the premise 'no other people in the world will say A', which does not contradict the first premise but does 
make the conclusion false. 
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obligation. The difficulty is that permission and obligation in the real world are fuzzy. What is 
permission, exactly? How is permission granted, when, and to whom? Are individuals who are 
indistinguishable by the system (e. g., use identical credentials) the same individuals with the 
same permissions? There is nothing in the world that forces an individual to fulfill an obligation, 
so what does 'obligation' in the model mean? Similar points can be made about epistemic logic 
(Hendricks & Symons, 2006), modeling belief and knowledge. For example, what does 'knows' 
mean in the face of overhearing a dinner conversation or discovery of secrets through 
insufficient statistical aggregation (see Section 5.9.3)? We conclude from Fetzer's reasoning 
that a formalization of our inner arguments must be a formalization of the argument, and not a 
formalization of the world itself. 
Our conclusion is further strengthened by G6del's incompleteness theorem, which states 
loosely that "any consistent formal system must be incomplete" (MacKenzie, 2001: pg 90). 
G6deI showed that in such a system S, there will be some theorem A that is known to be true 
but cannot be proved true. The existence of A can permit paradox. In other words, the world is 
larger than the world described by the logical system. The real world is the largest of all. 
Research and more experience are required to determine how to formalize an argumentation 
system for the inner arguments. Argumentation systems being developed by the Al community 
for use in law (e. g., (Bench-Capon & Prakken, 2005; Bench-Capon & Staniford, 1995; Gordon, 
1993)) could be useful. The work in truth management systems (e. g., (de Kleer, 1986) and 
follow-ons) could also be useful. We have been asked whether our arguments would constitute 
due diligence in the same way that a safety argument does. This question has both technical and 
legal implications, both of which we are interested in exploring. Although the details of the 
arguments themselves are not directly relevant, the framework used in Bandara et al. 's work on 
security argumentation for firewalls should be further investigated (Bandara, Kakas, Lupu, & 
Russo, 2006). 
Hunter's work on argument representation and consistency is very germane (e. g., Hunter, 
2004,2005). In particular, the techniques for tolerating inconsistency of the knowledge base, 
and the incorporation of belief and relevance into a formal structure, are very interesting. 
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We also wish to explore tools for representing our Toulmin arguments, or something close to 
them. Tools like Compendium (Compendium Institute, 2005) and Araucaria (Reed, 2005) hold 
promise, albeit for different reasons. Compendium is designed to capture arguments, while 
Araucaria is designed to represent and check their syntactic consistency. 
8.2.2 Other Future Work 
Correcting or improving upon the questions & challenges raised in Section 8.1 is one source 
of future work. For example, the issue of consistency of trust assumptions and arguments could 
be addressed by using a representation for trust assumptions in which the vocabulary and 
semantics are specified. The difficulty will be expressiveness and, of course, the issues raised in 
Section 8.2. L In addition, tool support for tracing the use of trust assumptions and propagating 
confidence would be helpftil. 
The aspect-orientcd requirements engineering (AORE) area (e. g., Rashid, Sawyer ct al., 
2002; Rashid, Morcira et al., 2003) offers many possibilities to investigate. One area to look at 
is whether security requirements (constraints) are usefully mapped into design aspects, which 
should be possible if there is traceability from the functional requirements into the design. 
Another would be to examine whether trust assumptions exhibit aspect-like crosscutting 
properties, and if so whether these properties could be used for cross-system risk analysis. 
We want to investigate incorporating a risk analysis framework such as CORAS (2005) into 
our security requirements framework. Doing so would help capture rationale for why certain 
secondary requirements can be considered suitably equivalent to the original primary 
requirements. In addition, CORAS has tool support that should be useful. 
One area that should prove fruitful is connecting our security requirements with one of the 
security-related UML variants. Doing so should help propagate some benefits of design model 
checking up into the functional and asset analysis stages. Equally useful, the asset analysis in 
the framework should help inform the development of the model. Some preliminary work has 
been done related to integrating the framework with UMLScc (JUrjens, 2005); the possibilities 
seem promising. 
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We want to develop aids for constructing the outer arguments, but it is not at all obvious how 
best to accomplish this. One idea we want to pursue includes developing a model for the 
behavior specifications that would permit checking the validity of the behavior, an idea related 
to the incorporation of UML possibility described earlier. In this case, trust assumptions would 
become assertions in the model. Other ideas that may or may not lead somewhere include proof 
templates, tools that guide construction of a proof by asking questions about behavior, and 
exploring the derivation of the outer (formal) arguments using a pseudo natural language. 
Some other future work opportunities are: 
* Tool support for managing the artifacts generated while using the framework, and in 
particular the traceability between them. 
Tools that can convert between the more powerful text representation and the more 
intuitive graphical representation. 
Incorporation of trust assumptions and argumentation into other requirements frameworks, 
for example i* & KAOS. 
Further use of the framework in industrial settings. 
8.3 Conclusion 
This thesis has presented our three contributions, and has shown how these contributions 
work together to improve capture and analysis of security requirements. To reiterate, the 
contributions are a security requirements framework, trust assumptions, and two-part 
satisfaction arguments. When using the three contributions during security requirements capture 
and analysis, a context is defined, the effects of security requirements within that context are 
understood, design constraints are taken into account, and the satisfaction of security 
requirements is established. The usefulness of these contributions has been validated. 
Our research is not unusual, in that it has provoked more questions and has suggested 
opportunities to extend our work. The extensions outlined in this chapter present significant 
challenges, which we look forward to addressing. 
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